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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, et al., 
Defendants and Appellants, 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
Intervenor and Respondent. 
Case No. 8457 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The declaratory judgment in the lower court was 
based upon documents received in evidence over the ob-
jection of appellants. It was not based upon an academic 
issue. Appellants' "Statement of Facts" is a statement 
of propositions of law. The facts are set forth in Exhibit 
2. Restated they are in part as follows: 
1. The appropriated funds for the operation of 
Weber College allocated to the eighth quarter of the 
~ 
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biennium were reduced by the governor on the day i1 
was expendable in the month of April, 1953, by $5,000.00. 
(Exhibit 2, Page 5) 
2. The appropriated funds to Weber College for the 
first fiscal year of the 1953-1955 biennium were reduced 
by the governor by $79,027.91. 
3. The appropriated funds to Carbon Junior Col-
lege were likewise reduced by the governor on Aprill, 
1953, the· day they were expendable, by $2,000.00. (Exhibit 
2, Page 10) 
4. The appropriated funds to Dixie Junior College 
were also reduced by the governor on April1, 1953, the 
day they were expendable, by $4,000.00 for one month. 
(Exhibit 2, Page 14) 
5. The governor and State Finance Commission 
refused to make available to the Board of Education, 
for research, appropriated funds in the amount of $20,-
000.00. (Exhibit 2, Page 24) 
6. The Finance Commission in 1948 refused to pay 
salaries fixed by the Board of Education for administra-
tive and supervisory personnel. (Exhibit 2, Page 43) 
7. The Finance Commission again refused in 1949 
to pay increased salaries for staff members approved by 
the Board of Education. (Exhibit 2, Page 47) 
8. The Finance Commission again refused in 1950 
to pay salaries fixed by the Board of Education to staff 
members. (Exhibit 2, Page 56) 
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9. The Board of Examiners refused in 1951 to pay 
the salary of the Superintendent of the School for the 
Deaf and the Blind fixed by the Board of Education at 
$500.00 per month and cut the salary to $425.00 per 
month. (Exhibit 2, Page 65) 
10. The Board of Examiners denied in 1952 the 
request of the Board of Education for authority to em-
ploy a custodian of a building on an overtime b.asis. 
(Exhibit 2, Page 85) 
11. The Board of Examiners in 1953 directed th~ 
l!..,inance Commission to reduce the salary of the State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, as fixed by the 
Board of Education from $10,000.00 per .annum to $6,-
000.00 per annum. (Exhibit 2, Page 91) 
12. The Board of Examiners then instructed the 
Finance Commission to delete the name of the State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction from the payroll. 
(Exhibit 2, Page 94) 
13. The State Board of Examiners in 1953 denied 
.a request of the Board of Education for approval of a 
salary of $5,200.00 a year to be paid a director of ele-
mentary education. (Exhibit 2, Page 98) 
14. A demand made in 1952 for payment of legal 
services incurred and costs for printing of leg.al briefs 
for the Board of Education was denied by the Finance 
Commission and treated by the Commission and the 
Board of Examiners as a claim against the St~ate requir-
ing an act of the Legislature to authorize payment. (Ex-
hibit 2, Page 104) 
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15. Request dated March 20, 1953, by the Board oJ 
Education of the Attorney General for special leg& 
counsel selected by the Board to represent it in its claim 
against the Board of Examiners, of which the Attorney 
General is a member, asserting that the salary of the 
Superintendent of Public Instruction may be fixed by 
the Board of Education was denied. (Exhibit 2, Page 
107) 
The foregoing Statement of Facts is indicative of the 
course of conduct found by the lower court to be illegal 
and beyond the powers of the Appellants. This is a 
justiciable controversy ripe for judicial determination. 
(See State of Wisconsin ex rei. Philip F. LaFollette, 
Governor, v. Theodore Dammann, Secretary of State, 
2641\!W 627,103 ALR 1089) 
The appellants have chosen to argue the points in-
volved in this case in seven parts. Respondents believe 
the subject matter more logically lends itself to a division 
into five parts as set forth in the five points hereinafter 
stated. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS DOES NOT HAVE AU-
THORITY TO DISAPPROVE DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS 
BY THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR PUBLIC 
SCHOOL PURPOSES. 
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POINT II 
THE GOVERNOR AND THE COMMISSION OF FI-
NANCE DO NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO REDUCE AP-
PROPRIATIONS MADE BY THE LEGISLATURE FOR 
PUBLIC SCHOOL PURPOSES. 
POINT III 
IF THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OR FINANCE COM-
MISSION HAVE ANY AUTHORITY OVER THE APPROPRI-
ATED FUNDS OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, IT IS 
MINISTERIAL. 
POINT IV 
JN, THE EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL THE DE-
PARTMENT OF FINANCE HAS NO AUTHORITY OVER 
THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
POINT V 
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION MAY EMPLOY INDE-
PENDENT LEGAL 'COUNSEL WHEN THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL IS REPRESENTING OTHER STATE AGENCIES 
ASSERTING RIGHTS IN CONFLICT WITH THE AUTHOR-
ITY OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS DOES NOT HAVE AU-
THORITY TO DISAPPROVE DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS 
BY THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR PUBLIC 
SCHOOL PURPOSES. 
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A. The construction of similar constitutional an( 
statutory authority prior to statehood in Utah limite( 
the powers of the Board of Education. 
In the decision involving the Plaintiff and Defend. 
ant in these proceedings, this court carefully traced the 
history of the constitutional provisions of the statntt!G 
surrounding the establishments of institutions of higher 
learning in the respective states of the country. The 
historical background in the western states of the con-
stitutional and statutory provisions involved in this case 
are likewise important and will first be considered. 
It is unfortunate that the Appellant in a statement 
of facts should express an opinion misconstruing the 
scholarly decision of the District Court. In a C'areful 
analysis and comparison of the State Constitution and 
the Federal Constitution, the District Court made clear 
the distinction between the State Executive Branch of 
Government under the State Constitution, which vested 
powers in the Board of Education and not the Chief Ex-
ecutive, and the Federal Executive Branch of Government 
which vests full executive power in the President. (Page 
4, District Court Men1orandum Decision) 
The issues herein involve the interpretation of two 
constitutional provisions: The first is Article 10, Sec-
tion 8 of the Utah Constitution which reads: 
"The general control and supervision of the 
Public School System shall be vested in the State 
Board of Education, consisting of the Superinten-
dent of P~blic Instruction and such other persons 
as the legislature may provide." 
10 
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Respondent will undertake to enlarge upon the clear and 
concise treatment and analysis of this constitutional pro-
vision made by the District Court in the first six pages 
of its decision. This constitutional provision has bear-
ing upon the five points treated in this brief and will be 
discuss as it applies to each point. 
The other constitutional provision is Article 7, Sec-
tion 13 of the Utah Constitution, which reads: 
"Until otherwise provided by law, the Gover-
nor, Secretary of State and Attorney General 
shall constitute a Board of State Prison Com-
missioners, which Board shall have such supervi-
sion of all matters connected with the State Pri-
son as may be provided by law. They shall, also, 
constitute a Board of Examiners, with power to 
examine all claims against the state, except 
salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law, 
and perform such other duties as may be pre-
scribed by law; and no claim against the state, 
except for salaries and compensation of officers 
fixed by law, shall be passed upon by the legisla-
ture without having been considered and acted 
upon by the State Board of Examiners." 
We here cite the last four pages of the District Court's 
decision, concur in its reasoning, and propose hereinafter 
to enlarge upon the legal citation of authority and con-
clusions therein expressed. 
A recognized rule of construction in determining 
the intent of the framers of constitutional provisions of 
legislative acts is to look to other states which have 
11 
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similar provisions and which have been construed l 
the time of adoption of the provision in question. 
Prior to the constitutional convention of the sta1 
of Utah the states of Nevada and Idaho had provide 
in their constitutions for a Board of Examiners. Ca: 
ifornia had similar provisions in statutory law. Case 
from these three states, prior to the Utah ConstitutioJ 
limited the authority of the Board of Examiners. 
1. The Nevada Cases 
The Nevada constitutional provision creating ~ 
Board of Examiners is identical with the Utah provisio]j 
except "until otherwise provided by law'' is omitted 
(Article 4, Section 21) The Nevada cases held that a 
"claim against the State" did not include payments 
originating with state agencies or liquidated claims. The 
Board of Examiners was also said to have only advisory 
authority as to claims requiring its examination. 
In Ash v. Parkinson 5 Nev. 15 (1869) an action was 
brought by the Sergeant at Arms of the Assembly of the 
State of Nevada for a writ of mandamus compelling the 
Comptroller of the state to pay a sUm. due the Sergeant 
at Arms for services rendered and a $5,000 contjngent 
fund for use by the Assembly. The claim had not been 
submitted to the Board of Examiners and the Comp· 
troller refused to issue a warrant. In considering this 
question the court said: 
"A claim is a demand by someone other than 
the state against it for money or property; but 
when the claim originates with the state, or in its 
12 
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behalf, and contemporaneously with its origin, and 
means and manner of payment are provided, as 
in the case of a bond, it does not then constitute 
a claim proper against the st.ate, but a liquidated 
and legalized demand against the treasurer.***" 
A second Nevada c.ase decided a year later con-
cerning the authority of the Board of Examiners was 
Lewis vs. Doran 5 Nev. 399 (1870). Plaintiff brought 
a suit for a printing bill against the Comptroller alleg-
ing that he had performed his services as agreed and 
that his bill had been approved by the Board of Examin-
ers and the Comptroller was refusing a w.arrant for pay-
ment. Plaintiff contended that upon examination by the 
Board of Examiners no further action was necessary and 
the claim should have been allowed. The court stated 
that the provisions of the constitution that no claims 
shall be passed upon by the Legislature without having 
been considered and acted upon by Board of Examiners 
was merely a statement that examination by the Bo.ard 
of Examiners was only advisory to the Legislature. This 
would give effect to the two provisions of the Constitu-
tion. 
The court held that the board was only advisory to 
the Comptroller and that the Comptroller had authority 
over the .allowance of claims irrespective of the action 
of the Board of Examiners. The examination by the 
Board of Examiners was intended as a double check on 
the disbursement of funds to accomplish its purpose by 
"giving a fuller airing and ventilation of claims, 
that might or probably would follow from one 
examination." 
13 
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A third Nevada case decided prior to the adoptio1 
was State v. llallock, 22 Pac. 123, 20 Nev. 326 (1889). Th~ 
court stated the issue in this case as follows: 
"The question is whether the Legislature caz 
require the Comptroller to draw his warrant f01 
the amount ascertained to be due by the Board 
of County Commissioners, or whether the StatE 
Board of Examiners, under the provisions of the 
Constitution, should have audited the claim." 
The court then cites the constitutional provisio11 
creating the Board of Examiners and the statutes there. 
under which provide that, for a claim for which an ap. 
propriation has been made but the amount of the claim 
has not been liquidated, such claim must be presente<l 
to the Board of Examiners. Another statute provide~ 
that for claims for which no appropriation has been made 
it must be approved by the Board of Examiners before 
submitted to the legislature. After examining these pro-
visions of the statutes and reasoning that they are logica1 
in their application, the court states as follows: 
"These provisions of the statutes present a 
practical and reasonable exposition of the pro-
visions of the Constitution, and place the author-
ity to audit unliquidated claims with the board 
created for that purpose by the Constitution." 
2. The California cases 
The California decisions prior to the adoption of 
our Constitution held that disbursements authorized b~ 
the state agencies need not be examined by the Boar<l 
of Examiners. 
14 
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The Constitution of the State of California did not 
establish a Board of Examiners. The Legislature, in 
enacting its Political Code in 1872, provided by Section 
364 that the Governor, Secretary of State, and Attorney 
General would constitute the Board of Examiners. The 
power and duty of the Board of Examiners was set out 
in Article 18 of the Political Code and the provisions 
there, with reference to the presentation of claims for 
which appropriations have been made or the presenta-
tion of claims for which no appropriation has been made, 
are practically identical with the early statutory pro-
visions and the present law in Utah. 
California, like Nevada, held that claims originating 
with state .agencies were not to be reviewed by the Board 
of Examiners. In the early case of The Board of Trus-
tees of the State Library vs. Kenfield, 55 Gal. 488 (1880), 
an action was brought to determine whether a voucher 
drawn by the Board of Trustees of the Library must 
first present their claim to the Board of Examiners for 
its .approval before money could be drawn by the Treas-
urer. The court's entire decision on this matter is as 
follows: 
"This is an application for a writ of mandate, 
requiring the respondent, State Comptroller, to 
draw his warrant upon the State Treasurer, in 
favor of petitioner, for money in the State Trea-
sury belonging to the State Library fund. The 
objection is urged by respondent that the books, 
etc., required by the library should first be pur-
chased, and the claims therefore be presented to 
the Board of Examiners for their inspection and 
15 
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approval. We do not think that the transactions 
of the Board of Trustees are the basis of claims 
within the meaning of Section 616 Political Code. 
The chapter of the Political Code referring to the 
State Library, places the library under the con-
trol of the Board of Trustees, and authorized the 
board to draw from the State Treasury, at any 
time, all the moneys therein belonging to the 
library fund; and the librarian is to purchase 
books, maps, engravings, paintings, and furniture 
for the library, 'according to such rules and reg-
ulations which the Board of Trustees may pre-
scribe.' Their judgment then, as to what books, 
etc., may be proper, to be added to the library is 
not subject to review by the Board of Examiners." 
The holding of this decision in 1880, so far as respon-
dents can discover, has not been challenged by any sub-
sequent case. 
3. The Idaho cases. 
The only Idaho case prior to the adoption of our 
Constitution followed the Nevada case of State v. Hall-
ock supra and limited the provision to unliquidated 
claims. Section 18, Article 4 of the Idaho Constitution 
creating the Board of Examiners used identically the 
same language as contained in the Utah Constitution with 
the exception that the section is not prefaced with the 
statement "until otherwise provided by law." 
In TVinters v. Ramsey, 39 Pac. 193, decided in 
January, 1895 an action was brought to require the State 
Auditor to issue a warrant for the payment of an amount. 
claimed by the plaintiff owing on a contract for the con-
16 
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struction of a wagon road. The court reviewed the con-
stitutional and statutory authority of the Board of Ex-
aminers and then stated as follows: 
"These sections of the Constitution and the 
statute require all claims against the State of 
an unliquidated character shall be submitted to 
this board for approval or rejection before the 
auditor shall draw his warrant therefor. This 
claim is of the class that must be submitted to 
this board, and approved by it, before the auditor 
can draw a warrant in payment thereof. The dis-
position of the court is upheld in the case of State 
vs. Hallock (Nev.) 22 Pac. 123, in which this pre-
cise clause in the Constitution of Nevada is passed 
upon by the court, and wherein the same posi-
tion is taken by the court. These conditions pre-
cedent not having been complied with, the motion 
to grant the alternative writ is allowed, and the 
petition dismissed." 
From the decisions in California, Nevada and Idaho 
prior tq the adoption in Utah of our Constitution we may 
conclude: 
1. That a claim as referred to in the Constitution 
is not a demand by the state or a claim which originates 
with the state in its behalf and arises contemporaneously 
with the origin of the demand. (Ash vs. Parkinson 
supra) 
2. The examination by the Board of Examiners is 
only advisory, and an additional check upon the payment 
of funds, the auditor having the ultimate power and 
authority to approve claims rather than the Board of 
Examiners. (Lewis v. Do ron supra) 
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3. Only unliquidated claims were intended to be 
presented to the Board of Examiners, for review and 
determination of the amount involved. (State v. Hallock 
supra) 
4. "Claims" did not include payment and disburse-
ment of money .authorized by other political agencies 
whose purchases and disbursements were not subject to 
review by the Board of Examiners. (The Board of 
Trustees of the State Library v. Kenfield, supra.) 
B. The Constitutional Convention debates clearly 
indicate that Section 13 could be subsequently modified 
by the Legislature. 
At the time of the constitutional convention there 
was considerable discussion concerning the adoption of 
Section 12, Board of Pardons, Section 13, State Prison 
Commissioners and Board of Examiners, Section 14, 
Insane Asylum Commissioners, and Section 15, Reform 
School Commissioners in Article ·vii of the Utah Con-
stitution. It will be noted that Section 12 is the fore-
runner of the four sections mentioned above, all of which 
deal with the establishment of some type of board or 
commission for the administration of specific agencies. 
At the constitutional convention it was moved that 
all of these sections be stricken for the reason that 
they were legislative in nature. The argnn1ent advanced 
when Section 12 was considered and action taken in con-
nection therewith was applied in a routine fashion to the 
18 
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other three sections. At the time of the second reading of 
these sections it was stated : 
"You will find in the report that after the 
third line in that section that which follows is 
legislation, pure and simple, and of such a nature 
that the Legislature should have control of it, .and 
they should have the power to change it when the 
necessities of our government may demand it. 
"" * "" It will relieve us of a great amount of 
legislation, a tendency which is added in most con-
stitutions of states recently formed, because we 
have tended in that direction too much. I prefer 
th.at we leave some little to the Legislature." Vol. 
1, Proceedings Constitutional Convention 933. 
The proceedings of the constitutional convention 
indicate that the framers of the Utah Constitution con-
sidered the section creating the Board of Examiners as 
involving a legislative function and, therefore, provided 
that the agency cre.ated by the Constitution should be 
maintained only until the functions were otherwise as-
signed by the Legislature. 
When the matters were debated later the following 
statements were made : 
"Mr. Thurman. 'Mr. Chairman, I would like 
to offer a substitute for both of these.' (Reads) 
'Until otherwise provided by law the Gover-
nor sh.all have power to remit fines and forfei-
tures, commute punishments, and grant pardons 
for all offenses against the State.' 
I do not se·e why this matter cannot be left to 
the Legislature. Of course, this leaves the matter 
where it is now ,but it gives to the Legislature the 
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right to create a board such as is here named, or 
any other kind of a board of pardons. • • • 
"l\ir. Varian. 'Mr. Chairman, taking the pro-
positions in their order, I would suggest, in speak-
ing to the substitute offered by my friend from 
Utah County, that there is no reason why we 
should not leave it to the Legislature.' • • • " 
When these sections came up for final reading the 
proceedings were as follows : 
"l\ir. Hyde. 'Mr. President, I have an amend-
ment to offer to Section 12, insert at the beginn-
ing of the section, 'until otherwise provided by 
law.' 
The amendment was agreed to • • • . 
Mr. Emery. 'Mr. President, I have no objec-
tion particularly to this section, but I think it 
deals with legislative matters too much.' • • • 
Section 13 was read. 
Mr. Hyde. 'Mr. President, I offer an amend-
ment on that section, to add at the beginning of 
the section 'until otherwise provided by law'. ' 
The amendment was agreed to. 
Mr. Creer. 'Mr. President, I move an amend-
ment to precede this section, similar to the one 
made to the other, 'until otherwise provided by 
law' And I may also offer the same amendment 
to Section.' 
The amendment "~as agreed to." 
(Vol. II Proceedings Constitutional Convention 
1895) 
The Defendants argue that this amendment related 
only to the composition of the Board, and not to its pow· 
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ers. This argumer:tt ·may find some support in thP 
technical wording of this section, but such an argument 
is not inconsistent with the constitutional debates. 
At the time of our constitutional convention it must 
be remembered that the states of Idaho and Nevada had 
incorporated into their constitutions provisions creating 
Boards of Examiners. On the other hand, the State 
of California had by statute created a Board of Ex-
aminers. In view of these two different ways of handl-
ing the matter in other states, it was to be expected that 
in our constitutional convention there would be some dis-
pute as to whether such provisions should be in the con-
stitution or should be handled by the legislature. It will 
be remembered that Sections 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the 
Executive Article of the Constitution established admin-
istrative boards and agencies. It was first moved that 
Section 12 be stricken from the proposed Article. This 
motion was rejected. Thereafter there was some discus-
sion with reference to Sections 13, 14 and 15. One of 
the delegates stated as follows : 
"Mr. Chairman, I hope the motion will pre-
vail to strike out Sections 13, 14 and 15. They are 
legislation pure and simple. If they work well, all 
right. If they do not work right we cannot get 
rid of them until the constitution is amended or 
until we have a new constitution." Vol II Pro-
ceedings Constitutional Convention, 1015-16. 
Delegate Varian, Chairman of the Committee on the 
executive branch of the government, argued at the time 
of the second reading of the section that 
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"The Convention should not refuse to put 
it into the Constitution because, as claimed, it is 
a matter of legislation. Of course, it is legisla-
tion-fundamental legislation. If they desire to 
leave the matter open for change, it is easy enough 
to amend all these sections by saying, 'until other-
wise provided by law.' That would obviate that 
objection, if it is an objection to the members of 
the Convention. It is not a reason for striking out 
the entire section." II Proceedings Constitutional 
Convention, 1017. (Empha;sis added) 
It will be recalled that upon final reading all of these 
sections were so amended by .adding at the beginning of 
each section the words "until otherwise provided by law.'' 
In spite of the convention debate Defendants argue 
that the words "until otherwise provided by law~' only 
affect the composition of the Board of Examiners· and 
do not and cannot affect the constitutional power and 
.authority of the Board. This contention is based on the 
fact that part of the section stated "with power to exa-
mine all claims against the state • • • and perform such 
other duties as may be prescribed by law." It is the 
Defendants' contention that it would be unnecessary to 
add the words "as may be prescribed by law" if it was in 
tended that the words "until otherwise provided by law" 
permitted the legislature to amend the entire section as 
it might deem appropriate. 
If the section had been originally drafted as it was 
finally enacted, there would be merit to such an argu-
ment. Without the amendment the section defined some 
of the duties of the Board of Examiners and authorized 
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the legislature to prescribe additional duties. Later, when 
the amendment "until otherwise provided by law" was 
eD!acted, the provrsion authorizing the legislature to pro-
vide additional duties became in p.art redundant but 
through indavertence was not deleted. 
The .attention of the convention was directed to the 
issue of whether the section should be frozen in the 
constitution, or whether, if included in the constitution, 
some provision should not be made permitting unlimited 
change in the future by the legislature. The fact that 
the constitutional section defines some of the duties of 
the Board of Examiners and specifies that they shall 
perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law, 
cannot, in view of the history of the enactment of this 
section, be interpreted to restrict the meaning of the 
words "until otherwise provided by l.aw." A reading of 
the proceedings at the constitutional convention can 
leave no doubt that the framers of the constitution in-
tended that all of these sections creating administrative 
agencies could be completely modified by future legisla-
tive enactment. 
Other constitutional provisions prefaced by "until 
otherwise provided by law" in Sections 12, 13, 14 .and 15 
of the same Article VII have all been modified by the 
Legislature and superseded by statutory enactments. 
Section 12 creating the Board of Pardons has been 
altered as shown by the present section 77-62-2 and 77-
62-3 U.C.A. 1953. Part of Section 13 pertaining to the 
St.ate Prison Commissioners has been modified as shown 
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in Section 64-9-1, U.C.A. 1955. Section 14 has been mod-
ified as shown in Section 64-7-2, U.C.A. 1953, and also 
Section 15 has been modified as contained in Section 
64-6-1 and 64-6-2, U.C.A.1953. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Legislature has 
intended to modify the remainder of Section 13 to per-
mit the Department of Finance to review miscellaneous 
personal claims. In addition to being a board of review4 
ing claims, the Board of Examiners was given the duty 
of being a board of supplies and purchases. (Stipulation 
Count 2, Paragraph 13) Thereafter when the Department 
of Finance was created, the functions of the Board of 
Examiners were transferred to the Commission of Fin-
ance which was to pre-audit all claims and the auditor 
was to post-audit the claims. Had the Legislature in-
tended to require in addition to the approval of the Com-
mission of Finance the approval of the Board of Ex-
aminers, they would have so provided since by specific 
amendment they were taking from the Board of Examin-
ers this authority and transferring it to a new depart-
ment. 
In light of the history of the incorporation into the 
Constitution, "until otherwise provided by law," the 
Legislature has now provided by statute elaborate 
methods for handling claims against the state. The 
Board of Education must comply with proper account-
ing procedures to safeguard and protect public funds. 
But such accounting procedures cannot nullify the au-
thority of the Board of Education as specified in the 
Constitution. 
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The Defendants argue that after the above discussed 
provision w.as inserted by amendment into these sec-
tions, a substitute to Section 12 was offered and rejected. 
A reading of the manner in which the substitute was of-
fered clearly shows that the delegate wanted to substi-
tute a short, concise paragraph for Section 12 in lieu 
of the rather lengthly and detailed section that was 
adopted. This being the purpose for the substitute, it 
cannot be validly argued that the reason the substitute 
was submitted was because it was felt that the provision 
"until otherwise provided by law" did not permit future 
modification by the legislature. The Defendants cite the 
case of Bishop vs. State Board of Corrections, 16 Utah 
478, 52 Pac. 1090, which held that an ~a0t empowering the 
Board of Corrections, rather than the Board of Pardons, 
to parole convicts under certain restrictions and limita. 
tions was unconstitutional. That case merely holds that 
until authority of the Board of Pardons as created by 
the constitution is changed by a legislative enactment 
another tribunal cannot exercise authority granted to 
the Board of Pardons. The issue herein discussed was 
not presented to the court. It was a case where the 
legislature had not modified the laws relating to the 
Board of Pardons but had attempted to create co-existent 
authority in the Board of Corrections involving some 
authority already granted to the Board of Pardons. 
For further enlightenment as to the intention of the 
framers of the constitution, an examination of the im-
plementing legislation passed in 1896 immediately after 
the adoption of the constitution shows that it was not the 
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intent of the legislature as they interpreted the constitu-
tion that the Board of Examiners should control all dis-
bursement of funds. Sec. 18, Chapter 35, Laws of Utah, 
1896, defining the duties of the Board of Examiners pro-
vided: 
"The state auditor shall not draw his war-
rant for any claim, unless it has been approved 
by the Board, except for salaries or compensa-
tion of officers fixed by law, or for monies ex-
pressly appropriated by statute." 
This additional provision was not found in the Montana 
Political Code Section 680, Codes and Statutes of Mon-
tana, 1895, which was otherwise copied by the Utah legis-
lature verbatim. 
The first Utah legislature had three types of 
statutes in other states which could be used as guides 
for enacting implementing legislation. 
In Nevada the legislature limited the authority of the 
Board of Examiners to the perfunctory duty of just 
examining claims of two types: (1) A claim not sup-
ported by .an appropriation, and (2) A Claim supported 
by an appropriation where the claim was unliquidated. 
If the board failed to examine the unliquidated claim 
within thirty days, the Comptroller could proceed with-
out examination by the board. (Sec. 23-60, 61, Compiled 
Laws of N ev.ada 1873) 
In contrast, the Idaho statutes did not confine the 
authority of the Board of Examiners to examination of 
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just two types of claims, but gave it enlarged powers by 
stating: 
"The board may approve or disapprove any 
claim or demand against the state or any item 
thereof, or may recommend a less amount in pay-
ment of the whole or any item thereof, and a deci-
sion of the majority of the members shall stand 
as the decision of the board." (Session Laws 1899, 
Page 24, Sec. 3 ; Session Laws 1891, Page 46; 
Codified Idaho Codes 1901, Sec. 344) 
This broad statute obviously, influenced the Idaho Su-
preme Court, which in part distinguishes and explains 
the Idaho cases. 
The third type of statute and the one actually adopt-
ed in Utah was in the Laws of Montana. (Sec. 680, 
Codes and Statutes of Montana, 1895) Similar laws were 
enacted in California; (Sec. 654-685, Political Code 1886, 
Calif.) however, when Utah copied these laws they added 
the additional provisions authorizing the auditor to issue 
warrants on monies expressly appropriated by statute. 
It is clear that the first Utah Legislature intended to 
follow a middle ground, and make their intent clear by 
modifying the laws as enacted in Montana and California 
to specifically exclude from the scope of examination of 
the Board of Examiners monies expressly appropriated 
by statute. Even without this exclusion the Montana and 
California cases have so interpreted their laws. 
C. The case law decided since statehood in other 
states having similar provisions has limited the authority 
of the Board of Examiners. 
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Nevada, Montana and Califo;rnia have limited the 
authority of the Board of Examiners. Idaho has refused 
to render the State Board of Education as the Board of 
Regents of the University of Idaho subservient to the 
Board of Examiners. 
The Defendants state that the Idaho, Nevada and 
Utah cases constitut'e the weight of authority holding in 
support of their contentions. It is the respondent's con. 
tention, however, that the cases from California, Nevada 
and Montana constitute the weight of authority, and that 
the Idaho cases can be distinguished. A brief review of 
the cases in the other jurisdictions show that the weight 
of authority is consistent with the position now taken 
by the respondent. The early Nevada case of Ash vs. 
Parkinson supra and the second Nevada case of Lewis 
vs. Doran, supra and the third case of State vs. Hallock, 
supra have heretofore been discussed. (See page 12) 
The Defendants attempt to distinguish the case of 
Board of Trustees vs. Kenfield, supra on the ground 
that it was a statutory agency rather than a constitutiona1 
agency. This supposed distinction completely ignores the 
fact that the court was construing the same language as 
defined the authority and duties of the Utah Board of 
Examiners. The case further specifically limits the def-
inition of the word "claim." The definition there made 
is consistent with the definition and limitation establish-
ed in the early Nevada case of Ash r. Parkinson, supra. 
The Montana Constitution (Section 20, Article 7) 
directs the State Board of Examiners to examine all 
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claims against the state. It is almost identical with the 
Utah provision. A statutory provision (Section 262, 
Montana Revised Code) says: 
"The board of examiners may at any time, 
when necessary, employ clerical help for any state 
officer or board, and no clerks must be employed 
by such officers or board without the authority 
of the board of examiners, and no such clerks must 
be employed by the board of examiners except 
when all the duties of the officers cannot be per-
formed by the officer himself." 
These two provisions were construed in the case 
of State v. Ounnningham, 101 Pac. 962, 33 Montana 165 
(1909). In 1909 the Board of Examiners authorized the 
employment of a stenographer at the rate of $150 per 
month by the judges of the Supreme Court. The Legisla-
ture had appropriated an amount which would have per-
mitted the payment of $200 per month for the stenog-
rapher who had been employed by the Supreme Court 
since 1896, and who, since 1901, had been receiving pay 
of $150 per month. 
The issue was whether the Board of Examiners had 
power and authority to specify the amount of payment 
which would be made to the employee of the Supreme 
Court. The suit was in mandamus to compel the auditor 
to issue a warrant in the amount of $200 a month. 
The court after citing the constitutional provisions 
establishing the Board of Examiners and Section 262 
Revised Code, cited above, stated as follows : 
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"The result of this action, if it be held to be 
of binding force, is that this court in some of its 
important functions is subject to the control of 
the state board of examiners; for to say that it 
may grant the court permission to employ a steno-
grapher is to say that in its discretion it may with-
hold permission. This means no more or less than 
that, though the services of a stenographer are 
absolutely necessary to the proper accomplish-
ment of the work of the court - a fact about 
which there can be no dispute - the board may in 
its discretion cut off all such services, and thus 
virtually disable the court, or at least seriously 
impede and hamper it, in the discharge of its 
duties. To say that it may fix the compensation 
to be paid for each service is also an assertion 
of the same power; for, if through mistake or 
lack of knawledge, or from any other cause, if any 
sttch exist, the board should fix the compensation 
at such a figure as to render it impossible to se-
cure suitable service, this would be attended by 
the same consequence as if no cmnpensation were 
allowed. The constitution of this state reserves 
the powers of government in three distinct de-
partments - the legislative, executive, and judi-
cial. * * *" 
The court then cites the section of the Constitution which 
provides for the three deparhnents of government and 
then further states with reference to said section as fol-
lows: 
"It is within the knowledge of every intel-
ligent man that its purpose is to constitute each 
department an exclusive trustee of the power 
vested in it, accountable to the people alone for 
its faithful exercise, so that each may act as a 
check upon the other, and thus may be prevented 
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the tyranny and oppression which would be t-h'e 
inevitable result of enlargement of all power in 
the hands of one body. It is incumbent upon each 
department to assert and exercise all its power 
whenever public necessity requires it do so; other-
wise, it is recreant to the trust reposed in it by 
the people. It is equally incumbent upon it to re-
frain from asserting a power that does not belong 
to it, for this is equally a violation of the people's 
confidence. Indeed, the distinction goes so far 
as to require each department to refrain from in 
any way impeding the exercise or the proper func-
tions belonging to either of the other depart-
ments." 
The court then analyzed the duties required of a 
stenographer employed by the court. Mention is made 
of the particular qualifications required of such an em-
ployee, more particularly that he must be able to com-
plete citations to cases, record testimony of witnesses 
when any hearing is held before the court, and that the 
employee has confidential information concerning de-
liberations and results of cases which require great care 
to be exercised in selecting the person employed. It was 
further stated as follows: 
"In view of these considerations, it is mani-
fest that the power to select the proper employee 
could not with propriety be vested elsewhere than 
in the court itself; and it is equally manifest that 
the power to say whether it may or may not be 
necessary to have assistance, and what the qualifi-
cations of the assistant shall be, may not be vested 
elsewhere. If the power of appointment exists 
at all, it is a nec~ssary power of the court, and, 
since the qualifications of the individual desired 
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is detennined in a measure by the amount of com-
pensation paid for his services, the power to fix 
the compensation is also a necessary power. In 
short, the court has the inherent power to select 
and appoint its own necessary assistants and make 
the compensation due for their services a charge 
against the state as a liquidated claim. Any other 
conclusion would be to put the court in the atti-
tude of a petitioner to the board of examiners 
from time to time, and thus reduce it from its 
position as a coordinate branch of the government 
to the level of the ordinary citizen who desires 
or claims payment for services rendered. * * • 
"But the legislature could with no more pro-
priety lodge in that department the power to ap-
point the employees of this court than it could 
empower the court to appoint the employees of 
the various executive offices. The provision of the 
constitution, supra, cited as a justification for the 
action of the board, has no application to a claim 
such as the one here involved. Nor has Section 
226, Revised Codes, which declares in the form of 
a statute the prohibition embodied in the constitu-
tion. Both apply to unliquidated claims, and not 
to those the amounts of which have been fixed 
specifically by contract or by any department of 
the government having authority to fix them." 
Although the court in the above case is referring to 
the judicial branch of government, its analysis of the 
statute and constitutional provision has application here. 
It does not require much imagination to visualize the end 
result of the control of salaries of directors and employ 
ees of the Board of Education by the Bo.ard of Examiners. 
It is manifest that the power to select directors to carry 
forward the educational super~sion of the Department 
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of Education cannot properly be vested elsewhere than 
in the Board of Education. The Board is a constitutional 
body created by the people. If the directors and employ-
ees of the Board of Education are compensated as the 
Board of Examiners may determine, the constitutional 
body is then placed in the position of a petitioner as any 
ordinary citizen having an unliquidated claim against the 
state. 
The statutes of Montana appear to give broader 
authority to the Board of Examiners over disbursements 
of appropriated funds than the Utah statutes. The Su-
preme Court of Montana, notwithstanding, refused the 
Board of Examiners control over the funds of an ed-
ucational institution. One Montana statute (850 Revised 
Codes of 1921) provided: 
"The state board of examiners * * * shall 
have supervision and control of all expenditures 
of all moneys, appropriated or received for the 
use of said (educational) institutions from any and 
all sources, other than that received under and by 
virtue of the acts of Congress * * * shall let all 
contracts* * *and shall audit all claims to be paid 
from any moneys, * * * but * * * shall have 
authority to confer upon the executive boards of 
such institutions such power and authority in con-
tracting current expenses, and in auditing, pay-
ing, and reporting bills for salaries or other ex-
penses incurred in connection with such institu-
tions, as may be deemed by said state board of 
examiners to be to the best interest of said institu-
tion." 
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In the case of State vs. Erickson, 244 Pac. 287, 75 
Montana 429, referring to these sections, the court said: 
"These sections show the extent of the 
authority of the board of examiners concerning 
the expenditure of public funds. When the board 
of examiners has exercised the powers conferred 
upon it by the Constitution and legislative enact-
Inents of the state, its functions are ended. State 
es rel Schneider v. Cunningham, 101 P. 962, 39 
Mont. 165; Porter v. Hartley 216 P. 344, 67 Mont. 
244. While this board is given supervision and con-
trol over the expenditures of moneys approp-
riated or received for the use of the educational 
institutions of the state, this power does not 
authorize an arbitrary reduction by the board of 
valid appropriations and authorized expenditures 
from available funds applicable to such appropria-
tions and expenditures which have been duly made 
and authorized by the Legislative Assembly and 
have received the approval of the Governor. Such 
attempted substitution of the judgment of execu-
tive officers for that of the legaslative body con-
stitutes a usurpation of legislative functions which 
cannot be permitted under our coru;titutional divi-
sion of state government into its three co-ordinate 
departments; the authority to do so was denied 
the governor in the exercise of his veto power in 
Mills vs. Porter, 222 P. -128, 69 )font. 325, 35 
A.L.R. 592, and there is much less reason for 
sustaining the exercise of such power by an execu-
tive board. When the Legislative Assembly has 
expressed its solemn judgment as to the amount 
necessary for the support and maintenance of an 
institution for the fiscal year, and in doing so 
has kept within the restrictions ilnposed by the 
Constitution both as to such general appropria-
tion and its appropriations generally for such 
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year, the executive and judicial departments of 
the state must bow to that judgment." 
By statutory authority cited in the foregoing case, 
the Board of Examiners is given broad and sweeping 
authority over the funds appropriated for the use of the 
educational institutions of that state. This statutory 
authority is in addition to the constitutional provision 
establishing the Board of Examiners. Yet, even under 
these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the 
Board of Examiners did not have authority to interfer.~ 
with the funds appropriated or expenditures authorized 
by appropriation made by the Legislature. 
The development of the Idaho cases and the Idaho 
law is substantially different from any of the other states. 
The Idaho Constitution provides that the Supreme Court 
may review claims against the state in addition to the 
Bo.ard of Examiners. The enabling legislation of the 
State of Idaho was much broader than found in any other 
state; a factor which obviously influenced the Idaho court 
in its decisions. 
The Idaho case prior to the adoption of the Utah 
Constitution was Winters v. Ramsey, supra, decided in 
January 1895. Then followed Pyke v. Stuenenberg, 5 
Idaho 614, 51 Pac. 614 ( 1897) which started upon the 
assumption that the claim had to be presented to the 
Board of Examiners, and was brought to compel action 
by said Board. The case followed shortly after this was 
Bragaw v. Gooding, 14 Idaho 288, 94 Pac. 438, which 
involved an attempt by the auditor of the State of Idaho 
35 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to employ two of his relatives in his office and to compel 
payment to said relatives without having those claims 
approved by the Board of Examiners. The court in this 
case felt compelled to hold that the action by the auditor 
should be subject to review by someone other than the 
auditor himself, and held that the Board of Examiners 
had that authority. 
The Idaho Constitution is unlike ours in that it 
provides that in addition to the Board of Examiners re-
viewing claims against the state, the Supreme Court shall 
hear and determine claims against the state. Article V, 
Section 10, of the Idaho Constitution provides : 
"The Supreme Court shall have original juris-
diction to hear claims against the state, but its 
decision shall be merely recommendatory; no pro-
cess in the nature of execution shall issue there-
on; it shall be reported to the next session of the 
legislature for its action." 
Article IV, Sec. 18, of the Idaho Constitution, which 
provides for the Board of Examiners, has been amended 
twice by the people, thus incorporating the prior con 
stitution which has not been the case in the State of 
Utah. The first amendment was proposed by the Session 
Laws, 1939, page 671, S.J.R. No. 7, and ratified at the 
general election in 1940. The section was again amended 
.as proposed by the Session Laws of 1945, page 398, H.J.R. 
No. 3, and ratified at the general election in November, 
1946. 
Enabling legislature setting up and defining the 
powers and duties of the Board of Examiners provided 
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that the state auditor is ex officio secretary of the State 
Board of Examiners. 
Enabling legislation passed in 1899 (5th Session, 
page 24, Sec. III; and Laws of 1891, 1st Session, page 
46,) in defining the duties of the Board of Examiners 
stated: 
"The Board may approve or disapprove any 
claim or demand against the state, or .any item 
thereof, or may recommend a less amount in pay-
ment of the whole, or any item thereof, and a 
decision of a majority of the members shall stand 
as the decision of the Board." 
However, even Idaho has not gone so far as to hold 
that a claim against a constitutional body is one which 
must be presented to the Board of Examiners. In the 
case of State vs. State Board of Education, 196 Pac. 201, 
33 Idaho 415 ( 1921), the Idaho court held that a claim 
against the Board of Education as the Board of Regents 
of the University of Idaho was not a claim against the 
state such as would require approval of the Board of 
Examiners. The authority granted the Board of Regents 
was similar to the authority granted to the Intervenor in 
that it provided that the general supervision, control and 
direction of the University was delegaJted by the constitu~ 
tion to the Board of Education. So the Idaho cases can-
not even be said, as to the facts of this case, that they are 
contrary to the position taken by the respondent since 
in the foregoing case it was held that as to a constitu-
tional body with constitutional authority the definition 
of claims would be restricted so as not to require ex-
amination and approval by the Board of Examiners. 
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In view of the foregoing cases it is contended that the 
Nevada, ~fontana, California and even Idaho cases sup-
port the contention of the Respondent and have limited 
the authority of the Board of Examiners. 
D. There is no specific statutory authority requir-
ing approval of disbursements by the Board of Ex-
aminers. 
The Defendants attempt to answer this assertion 
under their Point II. In support of their position they 
cite Sec. 53-3-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which pro-
vides in p.art as follows : 
"At the end of each month the state superin-
tendent shall file with the State Board of Ex-
aminers .an itemized account of his expenses, in-
cluding those of the State Board of Education 
verified by his oath." 
In considering the foregoing section with other pro-
visions of the l·aw for disbursement of funds, it is obvious 
that the foregoing statute provides only for the review 
of the personal expenses of the superintendent of public 
instruction and the bo.ard members, as contrasted with 
the disbursetnent of funds for institutions under the con-
trol of the State Board of Education. Sec. 64-1-16, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, provides in part as follows: 
"On the first day of each month, or as soon 
thereafter as the bills for the expenses for the 
previous montll have been audited, the governing 
board of each state institution, • • • shall1nake a 
requisition upon the state auditor for a warrant in 
sufficient amount to pay the bills so audited, and 
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thereupon the state auditor shall draw his war-
rant ag.ainst the appropriation made for such in-
stitution for the amount named in the requisition 
. . . " 
This section obviously applies to the disbursement of 
funds appropriated by the legislature for the operation 
of the various institutions under the control of the State 
Board of Education, more particularly Weber College, 
Dixie Junior College, Carbon College, the Vocational 
Schools .and the Deaf and Blind Schools in the State of 
Utah. 
This section would also apply to the expenses for 
materials and supplies and employees of the State Board 
of Education. The section states that the governing 
board shall audit the expenses for the previous month 
and shall file the same with the .auditor who shall draw 
a warrant against the appropriation made for such in-
stitution. Now here does it appe·ar that the Board of Ex-
aminers should examine the request for disbursements 
of the institutions ag.ainst their specific appropriations. 
At one time time the law did specifically provide 
that ·the Board of ·Examiners should approve all re-
quested disbursements against appropriations made to 
the various institutions. Sec. 26-0-21, Revised Statutes 
of Utah, 1933, (Stipulation Count 2 and 3, P.ar. 22) pro-
vided: 
"The State Board of Examiners shall not al-
low any demand payable out of any appropria-
tions made to any state institution until the s.ame 
is presented to the Board of Trustees or Board of 
Control of such institution • • •. Copies of such 
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bills in itemized form shall be transmitted month-
ly, together with a statement thereof approved 
and verified by the proper officer or officers of 
such institution, to the Board of Examiners for 
its approval or disapproval." 
Sec. 26-0-22, Revised Statutes of 1933, provided "the 
State Auditor shall not draw his warrant to cover any 
claim against any appropr~ation made until such claim 
or claims have been approved by the Board of Examin-
ers." The foregoing two sections were repealed by the 
Laws of Utah, 1941. Second Special Session, Chapter 
27, Sec. 3. 
The legislature has specifically eliminated any re-
quirement that the Board of Examiners approve war-
rants drawn on .appropriations before issuance by the 
state auditor. The statute requiring approval by the 
Board of Examiners has been specifically repealed. The 
Respondent does not contest the authority of the Board 
of Examiners to examine personal expenses of the state 
superintendent and the board members. It is felt that 
such a requiren1ent is reasonable since it provides for an 
independent audit of these personal claims. However, 
as to the other expenses of institutions under the control 
of the Respondent, the board and the state superintend-
ent audit those claims, in addition to the directors of 
those institutions, thus giving the independent check 
required to safeguard expendi,ture of public funds. 
The same legislative history is shown with reference 
to employing persGnnel by the State Board of Education. 
Sec. 75-7-2, Revised Statutes, 1933, (Stipulation Count 1, 
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Par. 3) provided that the State Board of Education upon 
the recommendation of the state superintendent may 
appoint a secretary of the board and "The salary of the 
secretary shall be fixed by the board, subject to ap-
proval of the State Board of Examiners, and it shall 
be paid from any money appropriated for that purpose." 
Sec. 75-7-2, U.C.A. 1943, was amended eliminating the 
specific approval of the Board of Examiners. 
The present law, Sec. 53-2-8, U.C.A. 1953, provides 
that the Board of Education: 
"May appoint such assistant superintendents, 
directors, supervisors, assistant, clerical workers 
and other workers, as in the judgment of the board 
may be necessary to the proper administration of 
the public school system. The salary of such 
assistant superintendents, directors, supervisors, 
assistants, clerical workers and other employees 
shall be fixed by the board and shall be paid from 
money appropriated for that purpose." (Stipula-
tion Par. 3) 
For the Defendants to .argue that Sec. 53-3-9, U.C.A ~ 
1953, which provides for the submission of the personal 
expenses of the superintendent and members of the 
State Board of Education is sufficiently broad to grant 
to the Board of Exarniners statutory authority to ap-
prove or disapprove expenditures of the State Board of 
Education generally, completely ignores Sec. 64-1-16, 
U.C.A., 1953, cited .above, pertaining to the drawing of 
vouchers for expenses by the governing board of state 
institutions for previous months and completely ignores 
the legislative history whereby prior approval of the 
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Board of Examiners has been specifically eliminated by 
the legislature. 
The fact that Sec. 53-3-9 requires Board of Examin-
er approval and Sec. 64-1-16 does not, shows that if the 
legislature so intended they could have provided for 
approval by the Board of Examiners. It is, therefore, 
clear that the Board of Examiners does not have any 
statutory authority requiring approval or disapproval 
by said Board for the disbursement of funds appropri-
ated by the legislature to the Board of Education for the 
maintenance of institutions under its general control 
and supervision. 
E. Reasonable construction of the Utah Constitu-
tion requires that each section be given effect. 
To interpret the section creating the Board of Exam-
iners in the manner asserted by the Attorney General 
and Board of Examiners would tend to nullify the othei" 
provisions of the constitution, more particularly the 
section creating the three departments of government 
and the se0tion empowering and authorizing the State 
Board of Education to supervise and oontrol the public 
school system. Such an interpretation is contrary to the 
uniform rule of construction that an interpretation will 
be adopted which will give effect to all provisions of a 
constitution or statute. 
Defendants' brief answering the University of Utah 
discusses and relies upon the above mentioned rule of 
interpretation. The Defendants stated: 
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"It is also well established that a constitu-
tion must be examined as a whole giving full ef-
fect, whenever possible, to every provision.'' 
The Defendants ,then cite a lengthy quotation in sup-
port of that proposition from Cooley's Constitutional 
Lim~tations. Although the Defendants rely upon this 
argument in support of their answer to the Plaintiff, 
they have completely ignored and failed to answer the 
application of this argument, as asserted by the Respond-
ent. If the Board of Education is to have general con-
trol and supervision of the public school system, it cannot 
be hopelessly subordinated to the Board of Examiners 
in the employment of personnel, expenditure of funds, 
and in other ways as shown by the exhibit in this action. 
The Defendants state that it is only the money spend-
ing power of the Board of Education that the Board of 
Examiners supervises and "this does not qualify the 
powers of the Board of Education." (Page 49) Even the 
Idaho courts which have gone furthest in sustaining 
broad power in the Board of Examiners has recognized 
that where the Constitution granted to the State Ba,ard 
of Education as Regents of the University of Idaho gen-
eral supervision and control of the University to 
"Confer upon the Board of Examiners power 
to pass upon claims against the Board of Regents, 
would make the latter board subservient to the 
former, and in the final analysis would operate 
to deprive the Board of Regents of the control 
and direction of the funds of an appropriation 
to the University." State v. State Board of Edu-
cation, supra. 
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The exhibits filed in this action are conclusive of the 
fact that the Board of Examiners have exercised com. 
plete control over the Board of Education by virtue of 
supervising expenditure of funds. Such control is exer-
cised to such an extent the Board of Education cannot 
even employ janitors on a temporary basis on up to em-
ployment of directors of institutions, creation of re-
search departments, etc., without first securing approval 
of the Board of Examiners. 
The Defendant cannot consistently argue that as to 
the University of Utah all sections of the Constitution 
should be given effect, and yet as to the Board of Educa. 
tion the section establishing the Board of Examiners 
should have precedence over the section establishing and 
defining the duties of the Board of Education. 
The Appellant under Point 4, has chosen to interpret 
and take issue with a selected statement made by the trial 
judge which is not determinative of this case. Whether 
the educational department of the state government is or 
is not classified as a fourth branch of government is not 
the important issues. Likewise, the issue here presented 
is not "Can the people by constitutional amendment 
modify the vesting of authority in the Board of Educa-
tion~" Educ.ation has been of paramount importance in 
the State of Utah. It received considerable attention at 
the Constitutional Convention, and was separately treated 
in the Constitution. 
The issue here is one of constitutional construction, 
of whether one board created by the constitution shall be 
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permitted to dominate another constitutional agency. The 
trial court, in rationalizing the intent of the framers of 
the constitution and the two sections involved, points out 
the vesting of control in the Board of Education not the 
chief executive or any other official. The Board of Ed-
ucation makes no claim that it is not subject to the laws 
of the Legislature, providing such laws are not in con-
flict with constitutional- provisions. 
In view of the Respondents' position that the Board 
of Examiners has no authority over claims originating 
with a state agency or that the authority of the Board 
of Examine,rs, if any, is limited to the performance of 
ministerial duties, it is not necessary to extend this brief 
by discussing the particular meaning of the exception 
"salaries or compensation fixed by law." Reference is 
made to the able discussion of this issue contained in the 
opinion of the tdal judge. 
F. The specific authority of the Board of Educa-
tion should have precedence over the incidental and 
general authority of the Board of Examiners. 
The State Board of Education is given the specific 
and primary duty of supervising the educational system 
of the state, while the Board of Examiners are given the 
authority to examine claims only as an incidental or 
secondary duty. 
The Defendants completely ignore the foregoing 
proposition and make no attempt to answer the s~ame 
in their brief. Rather, they take the position that the 
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Board of Examiners not only have the power, but must, 
ex.amine all claims and disbursements against the state. 
Such a position as a practical matter is illogical. The 
early Nevada case of Lewis v Doron, supra, recognized 
that a pra0tical· interpretation of the authority of the 
Board of Examiners must be given stating: 
"It must be remembered that this board is 
composed of state officers, having other high and 
responsible duties imposed and powers given by 
the constitution-this matter of examining claims 
being only an addition thereto ; so if there be 
any force, any argument that they are rendered 
subordinate, still such subordination is in only one 
particular, outside the special powers pertaining 
to their general official position." 
All of the arguments advanced by the Nevada Court 
apply with equal force to the present case. If it were not 
thought feasible to burden the three top state officials 
with the full responsibility of approving all disburse-
ment of funds in 1870, it cannot logically be maintained 
that in practice such officials should be compelled to 
perform such collateral duties under present-day condi-
tions. 
The provision creating the Board of Examiners is as 
though it were an amendment or an afterthought, being 
attached to the section of the Constitution creating the 
Board of State Prison Con1n1issioners. If the framers 
intended to cre.ate an all-powerful board, having author-
ity over all appropriated funds, the section accomplish· 
ing such a purpose would have received some specific 
discussion at the Constitutional Convention and would 
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have been stated separately and not as an appendage to 
a group of miscellaneous sections creating administra-
tive agencies to function "until otherwise provided by 
law." 
G. The nine members of the Board of Education are 
direct representatives of the people, having been elected 
by them. 
The nine members of the State Board of Educa-
tion are elected by the people and accountable to the 
people. 
The Defendants ignore this fact and contend the 
Governor should have authority to exercise budgetary 
control being responsive to the people. They argue: 
''Cries of destruction of constitutional gov-
ernment are not only ran overstatement but com-
pletely false. In fact, constitutional government 
is strengthened for the responsibility for exces-
sive expenditures or too drastic decreases in funds 
is placed directly on the governor. Public opinion 
and the exercise of the vote can thus operate not 
only on the Governor but on the legislature to 
modify the powers granted. This is constitutional 
government. Insulation of bureaucrats from the 
electorate and their indifference to public opinion 
is rHpl,aced by ra system responsive to public 
demands and requirements.'' 
This argument sounds in politics not law; but con-
sidered as political it also fails. 
The Supreme Court in the other phase of this law-
suit involving the University of Utah recognized that 
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a distinction should be made where a Board of Regents 
was appointed as contrasted to a Board of Regents 
elected by the people. This distinction was relied upon 
to distinguish the constitutions of Michigan and Colorado 
as compared to the constitution of the State of Utah. 
H. There are other adequate safeguards for the 
disbursement of public funds. 
It is the Respondent's contention that disbursement 
of funds duly appropriated by the Legislature to the 
Respondent for disbursement are not subject to the 
review of the Board of Examiners. The Board of Exam-
iners or such other agency as is delegated to review 
miscellaneous and incidental claims has no authority to 
interfere with the administration of the policies of spe-
cific agencies equally accountable to the people as the 
Board of Education. There are sufficient accounting 
procedures to insure that the funds are disbursed for 
public purposes and that the funds are adequately appro-
priated for the expenditures made. 
The Respondent does not contend that it cannot be 
required to submit its claims for a pre-audit to determine 
if they are for public purposes ·and within its appro-
priation. The Respondent is called upon to prepare 
budgets in advance and to submit its accounts to both 
a pre-audit and a post-audit. 
Section 63-6-19, U.C.A. 1953, (Par. 23, Count 2 of 
the Stipulation) specifically prohibits any board or 
commission from authorizing expenditures in excess of 
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their appropriations and further provides that so· to do 
would subject the members to a criminal complaint 
charging a misdemeanor. 
Section 67-10-1, (Par. 26, Count 2, Stipulation) speci-
fies that all of the boards and commissions of the state 
shall file biannual reports setting out in detail under 
oath the manner in which all appropriations have been 
expended. 
Section 5, Article 7 of the Constitution outlining 
the duties of the Governor specifically provides that the 
Governor may require from any officer or executive 
department any information relating to its condition, 
management and eX'penses. 
Certainly all of these provisions set up an adequate 
safeguard for the expenditure of public funds to insure 
honest handling of public funds and public airing of 
expenditures of the Board of Education. All of these 
safeguards are completely ignored by the Defendants, 
and it is then insisted that greater protection is needed 
for state funds, and that the Board of Examiners must 
examine all expenditures before the money is paid. A 
claim· only arises when a demand for payment of money 
is presented. The absurd position of Defendant's con-
tention is that the Board of Education may receive 
supplies and materials, may accept services, may enter 
into contracts, may instigate policies, and after the 
services have been performed, materials received and 
payment is to be made, at that time a claim arises 
which must be examined by the Board of Examiners 
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before payment can be made. We then have the ridicu-
lous situation of a Board of Education with power to 
contract but not power to perform, with power to agree 
upon terms of payment, but with no power to insure 
payment. Numerous instances appear in Exhibit 2. 
Must it be presumed that the framers of our con-
stitution found that the balance of integrity rests with 
Appellants 1 
I. The statutory authority of the Board of Exam-
iners does not contemplate review of disbursements 
authorized by the Legislature through the Board of 
Education. 
It is only logical that some agency be authorized to 
review miscellaneous personal claims against the state. 
If the amount is unliquidated or evidence is required, 
some claims tribunal must investigate into the matter and 
verify the claims for payment if an appropriation has 
been made or to make a recommendation to the Legisla-
ture for an appropriation if none has been made. It is 
illogical to require review by the Governor, Secretary 
of State, and Attorney General of all payments of money 
authorized for specific purposes by agencies specifically 
authorized by the Constitution and to whom an appro-
priation has been made by the Legislature. Certainly 
the Nevada decisions made such a practical interpretation 
and the Utah legislature so intended when it provided 
that monthly bills be approYed by the goyerning board 
which incurred the obligations and then warrants would 
be drawn by the auditor. (Sec. G-1-1-16, lT.C.A. 1953) 
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The state needed some court of claims or agency 
to review miscellaneous and incidental claims which 
may be presented by people who felt that they were 
entitled to some relief at the expense of the state. Such 
a body could be of great service in sifting facts and 
investigating the demands and in those cases where no 
appropriation had been certifying those facts to the 
Legislature for its consideration. Similar claims of a 
miscellaneous and incidental nature for which an appro-
priation had been made if they were not within the usual 
and normal jurisdiction of other branches of the govern-
ment should likewise be determined by a board having 
the authority generally to hear such claims and to deter-
mine that they were just and proper. 
After the constitutional provisions were determined, 
the Legislature in 1896 enacted the following three sec-
tions which implemented the provisions of Section 13 of 
Article VII. 
The claims for which an appropriation has been 
made are dealt with in Section 63-6-7 which provides: 
''Any person having a claim against the state 
for which an app,ropriation has been made may 
present the same to the Board in the form of 
an account or petition * * * and the Board must 
allow or reject the same in the order of its pres-
entation.'' * • * 
The second type of claim against the state is dealt 
with in Section 63-6-10, which provides: 
"If no appropriation has been 'made for the 
payment of any claim presented to the board, 
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the settlement of which is provided for by law, 
or if an appropriation made has been exhausted, 
the board must audit the claim, and, if it is 
approved, must transmit it to the Legislature 
with a statement of the reasons for the approval." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The third type of claim against the state is dealt 
with in Sections 63-6-11, 63-'6-12, 63-6-13, and 63-6-14. 
Section 63-6-11 provides: 
''Any person having a claim against the state, 
the settlement of which is not otherwise provided 
for by law, must present the same to the Board 
of Examiners, accompanied by a statement 
showing the facts constituting the claim, verified 
in the same manner as complaints in civil 
actions.'' (Emphasis added) 
The method of examination of claims is set forth in 
Section 63-6-13 as follows : 
''The board must at the time designated pro-
ceed to examine and adjust all such claims, and 
may hear evidence in support of or against them, 
and shall report to the Legislature such facts 
and recommendations concerning them as it may 
think proper. In making its recommendations the 
board may state and use any official or personal 
knowledge which any member of the board may 
have touching such claims. '' 
By the foregoing sections the Legislature has pro-
vided for a comprehensive plan in the three situations 
above named. There ~s no specific provision nor is 
there language from which it may be implied that the 
Board of Examiners has the ·power to deny the expendi-
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ture by the Board of Education of appropriated funds 
(when said funds are unexpended). 
The foregoing statutory provisions were copied 
from the law as it existed in Montana and California 
pertaining to the authority of the Board of Examiners. 
(Sec. 680, Codes and Statutes of Montana, 1895, Sec. 
663, Political Code of California, 1872.) Neither Nevada 
nor Idaho followed this classification and type of statute 
defining the authority of the Board of Examiners. The 
case of State Library vs. Kenfield, supra, the California 
court held that disbursements by the Trustees for the 
State Library were not subject to approval or included 
in the definition of claims to be submitted to the Board 
of Examiners. In Montana, in addition to the foregoing 
statutory authority, there was a statute granting to the 
State Board of Examiners supervision and control of 
all expenditures of monies appropriated or received 
for the use of educational institutions. (850, Revised 
Codes Montana, 1921.) In spite of this additional statu-
tory authority the Montana court held that the Board 
of Examiners does not have authority to interfere with 
the funds appropriated or expenditures authorized by 
appropriations made by the legislature to the educational 
institutions. 
Therefore, it appears that in the other two states 
having similar statutory authority, both states have con-
strued these statutes as not being intended to cover 
disbursements of funds appropriated by a legislature to 
a specific agency of the government. 
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If the statutes were not intended to apply to these 
types of disbursements, then it is logically asked what 
type of claims were to be presented to the Board of 
Examiners. The framers of the Idaho Constitution in-
tended the Board of Examiners to be just a Board of 
Claims as is shown from the following excerpt from the 
Debates and Proceedings, Idaho Constitutional Conven-
tion: 
MR. HEYBURN. Now, I renew my amend-
ment to section 18, which is to strike out all after 
the word 'law' in line 3. The reason is that in 
the report of the Judiciary committee, Section 
11 (10), it is provided that 'the supreme court 
shall have original jurisdiction to hear claims 
against the state, but its decision shall be merely 
recommendatory; no process in the nature of 
execution shall issue thereon; they shall be re-
ported to the next session of the legislature for 
its action.' This Section 18 provides that 'they 
shall also constitute a board of examiners, with 
power to examine all claims against the state, 
except salaries or compensation of officers fixed 
by law. And no clain1 against the state, except 
salaries and compensation of officers fixed by 
law, shall be passed upon by the legislature "With-
out first having been considered and acted upon 
by said board.' \Y e should make rules to be con-
sidered by this board and the supreme c.ourt 
and ·we ought to confer jurisdiction upon one body 
or the other. If we are going to \est it in this 
board, there is no necessity to -vest it in the 
supreme court; and if it is to be vested in the 
supreme court, there is no necessity to have it 
vested in this board. There is no necessity to 
hear those claims twice. It deprives the legis-
lature of the power to pass upon them until they 
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· have been passed upon by this board under Section 
18. Section 11 (10) of the Judiciary Committee 
provides that the supreme court shall act in this 
matter. 
''MR. AINSLIE. If the gentleman will exam-
ine the sections in the .Judiciary ·article and the 
one in this article, he will find no conflict at all. 
Section 18 only makes them a board of examiners, 
'with power to examine all claims against the 
state, except salaries or compensation of officers 
fixed by law, and perform such other duties as 
may he prescribed by law.' In Section 11 ( 10) 
the party who has claims against the state can 
commence suit in the supreme court. 'The supreme 
court shall have original jurisdiction to hear 
claims against the state, but its decision shall he 
merely recomrnendatory.' Now, these claimants 
originally can commence suit in the supreme court, 
and then the matter must be certified to the legis-
lature, and it will allow it. The supreme court in 
Section 11 ( 10) of the Judiciary bill is exactly 
like the court of claims in Washington. In the 
treasury department they have different powers; 
the first, second, third and fourth auditors, the 
comptroller of claims, etc. ; and all claims go to 
one of these officers. If the examiner for instance 
is the comptroller, and he rejects the claim, the 
claimant then has the right to sue in the court of 
claims to recover the amount. And that is the 
condition here. The governor, attorney general 
and secretary of sta,te constitute a Board of 
Claims, and if they allow it there is no necessity 
to go into court, if they reject it, then they go 
into court.'' Vol. 1, Proceedings & Debates, Idaho 
Constitutional Convention, page 1427. 
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The Defendants argue that the authority of the 
Board of Examiners cannot be confined to claims of 
a miscellaneous and incidental nature for which an appro-
priation has been made. The Defendants stated: 
"It is difficult to conceive such a situation 
for the legislature is prohibited from passing on 
a claim, that is, appropriating money to pay an 
individual's claim before the Board of Examiners 
has acted.'' 
There may be many instances when it is recognized 
by the state that there is a duty to compensate various 
individuals as a result of action on the part of the 
state. The amounts to be paid to any individual may 
not be known. The legislature then may appropriate 
a lump sum to be disbursed to people coming within 
the classification for whom the appropriation is made. 
As an example, the leases to the Beehive Midways, 
Inc., at the State Fair Ground and the construction 
carried ·on there was held void. Many people as a result 
had claims against the state. The legislature in 1951 
appropriated $60,000 to the Beehive Midways, Inc., et 
al, to be paid in settlement of those claims. 
There is an example of an -appropriation being made 
to settle specific claims, but those claims had to be 
adjudicated or determined so that all of the claims 
could be settled for the amount involved. This is one 
type of claim which the Board of Examiners has juris-
diction to consider. The statute seems to have that type 
of ·situation specifically in mind when it states: "Any 
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person having a claim against the state for which an 
appropriation has been made may present the same to 
the Board in the form of an account or petition.'' Cer-
tainly there must be some agency of the state which 
can review miscellaneous and incidental claims of the 
state and if an appropriation has been made, authorize 
payment, and if an appropriation has not been made 
or has been exhausted then they can be reviewed and 
recommended to the legislature. 
Numerous such claims are considered at each ses-
sion of the legislature. A glance at any appropriations 
act will show a long list of miscellaneous claims referred 
to them by the Board of Examiners. Included are claims 
of a tort nature where the state has not authorized itself 
to be sued. Others would be contract cases where the 
contracts have been declared void and there is a moral 
duty on the part of the state to reimburse or to pay in 
. compliance with the contract. There may be cases where 
the state has sold property to which they did not have 
a title and the only basis for a return of the money by 
the purchaser is a claim to the Board of Examiners. 
These are many and frequent such incidental miscel-
laneous personal claims which must be passed upon by 
some reviewing board before presentation to the legis-
lature. 
There were eleven members of the Constitutional 
Convention who were present in the 1896 legislature. 
At that time in the general Appropriations Act after 
specifying the amounts to each of the state institutions 
in Section 2, Chapter 128, it was provided: 
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"It is hereby declared unlawful for any state 
officer or state board of any of the institutions of 
the state to contract any indebtedness in excess 
of the appropriation herein provided, except by 
and with the consent of the State Board of Exam-
iners, previous to the contraction of such indebt-
edness.'' 
Similar requirements are presently contained in Sec-
tion 63-6-19, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Implicit within 
that section is the proposition that any state officer or 
state board may contract indebtedness for which appro-
priations have been made. If such were not the case, 
ther.e would be no reason for the limitation contained 
in Section 2. 
In 1899 Section 2070 of the Revised Statutes of 
Utah 1898 was amended to read as follows: 
"On the first day of each month, or as soon 
thereafter as the bills for the expenses of the 
previous month have been audited, the Board of 
Control of each state institution, or the proper 
committee thereof, duly authorized by the Board 
for such purposes, shall n1ake a requisition upon 
the State Auditor for a warrant in sufficient 
amount to pay the bills so audited, and thereupon 
the state auditor shall draw his warrant against 
the appropriation made for such institution for 
the amount named in the requisition, in favor of 
the treasurer of the governing board of the insti-
tution, or in case of the State Prison, in favor 
of the warden thereof. To obtain such warrant, 
the treasurer of the Board or the warden must 
·present to the State Auditor a written authoriza-
tion from the Board.'' 
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The law as therein stated has been substantially 
the same since that time and is now contained in Section 
64-1-16, U.C.A., 1953. The foregoing section does not 
state or infer that authorization by the Board of Exam-
iners must also be secured before funds are withdrawn. 
Rather the section is mandatory in that the auditor 
shall draw his warrant against the appropriation. If the 
Legislature had intended a review by the Board of Exam-
iners, they could have easily so provided as they did 
with reference to personal expenses of the superinten-
dent of public instruction and the members of the Board 
of Education wherein it was specifically provided that 
such expenses must be reviewed by the Bo,ard of Exam-
iners before payment. 
Section 18, Chapter 35, Laws of Utah 1896, copied 
verbatim from the Montana political code, Section 680 
Codes and Statutes of Montana 1895, with the exception 
of the clause underlined defined the duties of the Board 
of Examiners as follows : 
"The state auditor shall not draw his war-
rant for any claim unless it has been approved by 
the Board, except for salaries or com'pensation 
of officers fixed by law, or for monies expressly 
appropriated by statute. (Emphasis added) 
In view of the foregoing statutes, a usual rule of 
construction supports the contention that the legislature 
did not intend that the Board of Examiners should 
approve expenditures made by a specific Board or 
agency consistent within the appropriation made by the 
Legislature. 
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J. The Utah ca•ses have not yet decided to what 
extent the Board of Examiners may review the dis-
bursements and expenditures of the Board of Education. 
No Utah case has been decided by the Supreme 
Court which involves the power of the Board of Exam-
iners to pass upon disbursem·ents authorized by a con-
stitutional agency. In considering the Utah cases respon-
dent contends that the Board of Education is a consti-
tutional body and under the decided cases in Nevada, 
Idaho and Montana, is created by an act of the same 
dignity as that creating the Board of Examiners. That 
to ascribe to the Board of Examiners any power and 
authority which would circumscribe or interfere with 
the responsibility of the Board of Education to assume 
the general control and supervision over the public 
school system would be violative of the constitutional 
provision creating the Board of Education. 
The Utah Supreme Court first considered Section 
13, Article 7 of the Constitution creating the Board of 
Examiners in the case of Thoreson ·vs. State Board of 
Examiners, 21 Utah 187, 60 Pac. 982 (1900). The Legis-
lature appropriated funds for repayment of amounts 
paid by lessees pursuant to leases authorized by an act 
of the Territorial Legislature of the State of Utah 
which had been declared void. On rehearing the Board 
of Examiners maintained that the appropriations act 
was unconstitutional since it provided for the payment 
of claims which had not fi.rst been presented to the 
Bqard of 'Examiners for their approval prior to the 
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Legislature passing the act in question. In considering 
this case the court said : 
''The Board of Examiners are required to 
perform the duties mentioned in said section of 
the Constitution, and· also to perform such other 
duties as may be prescribed by law, therefore the 
only duties in the premises imposed upon the 
Board of Examiners, are such as Section 963 of 
the revised statutes prescribes. In our former 
opinion we held that the only discretionary power 
which the Board of Examiners had in the matter 
was to ascertain whether or not respondent's 
assignor had paid on a lease made in pursuance 
of the void act of the Territorial Legislature, the 
sum claimed by the respondent, and it having 
been admitted that said sum had been so paid, 
that such payment was therefore a just claim 
within the meaning of said section of the statute, 
and that said Board of Examiners had no right 
to reject said claim on the ground that Section 
963 of the Revised Statutes was a violation of the 
Constitution, but that it became and was amanda-
tory duty of the said board to receive audit, and 
allow said claim, and that mandamus lies to en-
force the performance of that ministerial duty. 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Miner discusses 
for the first time the language contained in Section 13, 
Article 7, "until otherwise provided by law." 
"By Section 13, Article 7, of the Constitution, 
the Board of Examiners were authorized, unt,il 
otherwise provided by law, to examine all claims 
against the state, except for salaries, etc., and 
they were authorized to perform such other duties 
as may be prescribed by law." 
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Thereafter Justice Miner sets out particularly the 
provisions of the section of the revised statutes involved 
and then further states : 
"By the Constitution the Board were to ex-
amine all claims against the State until other-
wise provided by law, and were also to perform 
such other duties as might be provided by law. 
'" * * 
''The power to allow a just claim is given 
by the act and is authorized by the Constitution. 
Until otherwise provided by law the Board were 
to act under the constitution. Until otherwise pro-
vided by law no claim against the State, except 
salaries, etc., could be passed upon by the legis-
lature, without having been considered and acted 
upon by the Board, but the board were to per-
form such other duties as might be provided by 
law and Section 963 was enacted in pursuance of 
the provision in the Constitution.'' 
In State v. Edwards, 33 Utal1 243, 93 Pac. 720, (1908) 
an action was brought by a court reporter against 
the state auditor seeking a writ of mandate directing 
the auditor to pay a mileage claim approved by the dis-
trict judge as provided by the statute. The auditor 
demurred to the petition on the ground that there was 
no allegation that the c lailn had been presented to the 
Board of Examiners as required by Section 13 of Article 
7 of the Constitution. 
The court did not discuss or cite the case of Thoreson 
·vs. State Board of E.ra miners, supra. It had before it 
the question as to whether or not the claim for mileage 
as fixed by contract must fhst be presented to the 
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Board of E)raminers. There was not pending before the 
court the question as to whether or not mandamus 
would lie against the Board of Examiners for the per-
formance of a minsterial duty or any other duty. The 
court ,said by way of dicta: 
''No doubt the Board of Examiners, in a 
proper ease may be subject to a proceeding in 
mandamus.'' 
The authority of the Board of Examiners as parties 
to the action was construed in two cases. The first case 
was State vs. Cutler, 95 Pac. 1071, 34 Utah 99. This was 
an action brought by a court reporter seeking to recover 
mileage. The claim had been presented to the Board of 
Examiners which refused payment on the grounds that 
the general appropriation bill of 1907 passed by the 
Legislature limited payment of mileage to that actually 
expended by the court reporter. The court directed the 
State Board of Examiners to audit and allow the claim. 
The court said at Page 108: 
"In view of the conceded facts, there is 
nothing upon whi,ch the respondents can legally 
exercise any discretionary powers in this case, 
and therefore they should have audited and 
allowed the claim. No doubt they would have done 
so had they not entertained a view of the law 
different from the one we feel constrained to 
take. In such a case it is clear that the law in 
effect directs what the action of the board shall 
be, and, this being so, there is no reason why the 
board of examiners should not be required to 
comply with what it commands. There would be 
something lacking in our system of government 
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or jurisprudence if under such circumstances a 
claimant could be defeated simply because the 
officer or board required to audit and allow his 
claim exercised some discretion in the matter. 
Where the duty to act is dear, and the law gives 
a right to obtain payment of a claim owing by 
the state, courts should not hesitate to enforce the 
right by mandamus. It follows, therefore, that 
the relator is entitled to have his claim for mileage 
as set forth in his petition audited and allowed 
·by the respondents as the state board of Exam-
iners.'' 
In the case of M arioneaux vs. Cutler, 91 Pac. 355, 
32 Utah 475 (1907) an action was brought for a writ 
of mandamus against the Board of Examiners on a claim 
for mileage presented by a District Judge. The Board 
of Examiners refused to audit and allow the claim upon 
the sole ground that they were advised and believed 
that there was no law of the state authorizing the allow-
ance thereof, and therefore rejected the claim. No par-
ticular mention was made of the authority of the Board 
of Examiners in this regard, it apparently being con-
ceded that the Board of Examiners would have discretion 
to disallow a claim if there were no supporting law for 
the presentment thereof. The court examined the law 
with reference thereto and concluded that a 1901 law 
allowing mileage had been repealed by implication by a 
law of 1903. And therefore sustained the action of the 
Board of Examiners. 
The most recent case of significance decided by the 
Utah Supreme Court involYing the authority of the 
Board of Examiners is the case of U intah State Bank 
64 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
vs. Ajax, State Auditor, 297 Pac. 434, 77 Utah 455, 
(1931). This is a proceeding before the Supreme Court 
seeking by mandamus to compel the State Auditor to 
issue warrants on the State Treasurer in favor of the 
Uintah State Bank on account of certain .bounty certifi-
cates issued by the county clerk of Uintah County to 
Viarious persons and assigned by them to the Bank. The 
Bank alleged all of the necessary requirements of the 
bounty law having been compiled with by the assignor 
of the claims and that the bounty statute provided that 
the Auditor is required to draw a warrant in favor of the 
person entitled to the same upon the State Treasurer in 
the amount shown by the certificate to be due. It is ad-
mitted that all of the requirements were met and that the 
nineteen claims are all identical. The only que,stion is 
whether or not the claim must first be approved by the 
Board of Examiners before being pre'Sented to the Audi-
tor. The bounty act nowhere required that the claim be 
pres·ented to the Board of Examiners. 
The court quoted Section 13, Article 7 of the Con-
stitution providing for a Board of Examiners and said: 
"Pursuant to this constitutional provision 
the legislature has more particularly specified 
the duties of the Board of Examiners in Title 
29, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917." 
In Section 2471 of Title 29 it is provided: 
"Any person having a claim against the state 
for which an appropriation has been made may 
present the same to the Board in the form of an 
account or petition.'' 
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Based upon this statute the court found that the 
B·ank 's claim came within the statute and denied the 
argument that it was not subject to the approval of the 
Board of Examiners. This statutory enactment of the 
Utah Legislature fulfills the constitutional requirement 
"until otherwise provided by law," upon which statute 
the Ajax case depends. 
J usti~ce Straup wrote an extensive dissenting opinion 
concurred in by Justice Ephraim Hanson. He pointed 
out that the claim for bounty was under a statute which 
was complete and which in effect produced a liquidated 
claim which should be paid by the State Auditor. In sup-
'POrt of this position that the statute refers only to 
unliquidated claims, he cited the Idaho and Xevada cases 
interpreting the constitutional provisions to so apply 
and said that the court in the majority virtually found 
the claim in this case to be unliquidated. It was the 
opinion of Judge Straup that: 
''What the court decided with respect to 
such a claim constitutes an adjudication and a 
precedent of binding effect as to unliquidated 
claims. 'What was said beyo·nd thai, 1cas mere 
dicta without binding effect. Callahan v. Salt Lake 
City, 41 Utah 300, 125 P. 863. While all members 
of the court concurred in the opinion, yet such 
does not constitute a concurrence in everything 
stated or discussed in the opinion or even as to 
all of the reasoning· therein. The discussion of the 
questions and conclusions reached essential to a 
proper disposition of the case were that of the 
court; but in concurring therein, it is not to be 
understood that everything stated in the opinion 
66 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was necessarily adopted as the opinion of the 
court.'' 
The State Board of Education takes the same view 
of the case. There is no direct holding in any Utah case 
where the Board of Examiners have been sustained in 
their refusal to allow a claim against the State author-
ized by a constitutional body where funds have been 
appropriated to pay such claims. 
The Defendants in their brief would cause this 
court to believe that the issues here raised have been pre-
viously decided in these three cases. 
In the Edwards case, the court concluded its orpinion 
as follows: 
''In view that the writ must he denied for 
the reasons stated, we cannot now pass upon the 
other questions raised by the respondent. The 
Board of Examiners whose duty it is under the 
constitution to pass upon the claim is not before 
us ; and thence would not be concluded by a de-
cision upon these questions.'' 
The Ajax case merely reaffirms the holding in the 
Edwards case. 
The holding in these two earlier cases is not and 
should not be binding in this case for the following 
reasons: 
1. The decisions in the cases were based in part 
upon the construction of statutory law substantially 
different from the laws applicable to this case. In the 
Edwards case the court cited specifically Sec. 946, Re-
vised Statutes of 1898, pertaining to authority of the 
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auditor to draw his warrant only after approval of the 
Board of Examiners. That the decision in the Edwards 
case was i nfact based in part upon statutory construc-
tion is shown by the following excerpts from the Ajax 
case: 
''This court had occasion to construe these 
provisions of the statute and of the constitution 
in the case of State vs. Edwards." 
And another place the court said: 
"It follows, therefore, from the constitution 
and statutes as thus construed, that the bounty 
cl'aims or certificates in question must be pre-
sented to and approved by the Board of Exam-
iners * * *." 
As previously discussed, the Board of Examiners 
does not have any specific statutory authority to review 
disbursements of the Board of Education except for 
the personal expenses of the State superintendent and 
members of the board. In addition, Sec. 946, Revised 
Statutes of 1898 had an additional exclusion which was 
not considered to be applicable in the Edwards or Ajax 
case, and was, therefore, not considered by the court 
in its opinion. This exclusion, as previously mentioned, 
excludes monies expressly a'Ppropriated by law from 
being first approved by the Board of Examiners before 
the state auditor may draw a warrant for disbursement 
thereof. 
2. Neither of the cases involved a constitutional 
agency exercising its specific authority. 
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The primary duty of the county clerk is not to 
audit and adjudicate factual issues relative to the killing 
of predatory animals. Nor is the primary duty of· the 
distr.ict judge to make and adjudicate contracts for 
mileage payments. However, it is the specific duty of 
the Board of Education to supervise and control the 
public school system ~of the state. More particularly, 
specific institutions are directly controlled by the Board 
of Education~ For these institutions specific appropri-
ations are made to the Board of Education for dis-
bursement as directed by said board. 
3. Neither the Edw~ards case nor the Ajax case 
involved the disbursement of funds after approval had 
been given by a multi-member board or agency. In both 
the Aj'ax and the Edwards case the claim was presented 
to just one person, who certified the same to the auditor, 
demanding payment without any other examination. The 
puJblic policy reasons for holding in such a case that 
the Board of Education should review the claim do not 
apply in this case. 
4. There is no inconsistency in holding that a bounty 
claim must be pres en ted to the Board of Examiners, 
but that a disbursement authorized by the Board of Edu-
cation need not be examined by the Board of Examiners. 
Such was the holding in two California cases. In 
the case of Ingram vs Colgan, 106 California 113, 38 Pac. 
315, the California couTt held that a claim for a bounty 
payment had to be examined by the Board of Examiners. 
However, the California court held in the case of State 
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vs. Kenfield, supra, that a disbursement by the Board 
of Trustees of the State Library drawn upon funds 
appropriated ·by the legislature was not such a claim 
as required review by the Board of Examiners. The 
Utah Court in the Ajax case cited as a supporting 
authority Ingram ·vs. Colgan, supra. The very quotation 
from the California case cited by the Utah Supreme 
Court indicates that the word "claim" can have a 
technical definition. Part of the quote is as follows: 
"Whatever the rule may be in cases which 
do not come within the te·chnical definition of the 
word 'claim,' we are of the opinion that, if any 
force is to be given to this section in any case, it 
applies to the present one.'' 
Two of the five Utah judges felt that even bounty 
claims need not be presented to the Board of Examiners. 
5. Neither the Edwards case nor the Ajax case 
discussed: 
(a) the case law as it existed prior to the adop-
tion of our constitution. 
(b) the proceedings at the Constitutional Con-
vention and the effect of the amendment 
"until otherwise provided by law." 
(c) the issue of the control by the Board of 
Examiners of the Board of Education com-
pris·ed of elective officials with specific con-
stitutional duties. 
(d) the nullifications of one section of the con-
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stitution by overemphasizing· the power 
granted by another section thereof. 
(e) ,a legislative history establishing prior stat-
t~tory authority requiring approval by the 
Board of Examiners with such authority 
subsequently being specifically withdrawn. 
6. Neither of the cases involved the Board of Ex-
aminers as a par'ty to the action. Consequently there 
was no issue raised requiring a holding defining the 
power and authority of the Board of Examiners. 
The facts and issues presented in this case are so 
dissimilar to the facts and issues raised in the Edwards 
and Ajax cases that even assuming that the dicta in 
the cases had persuasive effect the discussion therein 
could not be held applica;ble to this case. As Justice 
Straup in the Ajax case said, after pointing out that 
discussions unnecessary to an adjudication of the case 
constituted mere dicta without binding effect: 
''Every opinion or decision must be read 
and considered in the light of the facts upon 
which it is based and in view of the particular 
question or questions presented for decision. They 
constitute the foundation of the entire structure 
which cannot safely be used without reference 
to them. Attempts to pick out parts of an opinion 
without reference to the facts upon which it was 
based and apply them indiscriminately in other 
cases is bound to result in confusion and wrong 
results.'' 
The Defendants are indiscriminately picking and 
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choosing from an opinion when they- rely upon a recital 
contained in the statement of the case in State Board 
of Education v. Commission of Finance, Utah (1952) 
247 P. 2d 435, in support of their position. Tl1e 
Defendants admit on page 10 of their brief that the 
principal question in that case was the legality of the 
composition of the Board of Education. True, the attor-
ney general did make the statement in his brief that 
the Board of Examiners had authority as contended 
herein. The very fact that the attorney general's office 
has taken the position as herein asserted by the Defen-
dants was the reason the Board of Education felt re-
quired to employ separate counsel to present this issue 
and challenge the supposed authority of the Board of 
Examiners. 
The facts in this case, unlike any other presented 
to this court, clearly show that the State Board of Edu-
cation cannot supervise and control the public school 
system as required by the Constitution and be subject 
to the present conduct of the Board of Examiners. It 
now is completely subordinate to and dominated by the 
will of the Board of Exruniners. Salaries for the pro-
fessional staff of the State Department of Education 
cannot be adopted without approval of the Board of 
Examiners. Written contracts made in good faith be-
tween the State Board of Education and Directors of 
state schools are capriciously nullified by the Board of 
Examiners without investigation or explanation. The 
Board of Education obtain approval for the salaries of 
the directors of the institutions under its control and 
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supervision. The situation has become so bad that the 
Board of Education cannot now find competent person-
nel to fill vacancies as state directors of various depart-
ments of the public school system since it is known that 
such an appointment might be disapproved by the Board 
of Examiners. Under such circumst·ances the Board o:f 
Education has submitted a request for an authorized 
salary to be paid a state director of elementary educa-
tion. Such salary being less than was paid to the former 
director, and even this request is flippantly refused by 
saying, ''To many employees now." The Board of FJduca-
tion could not even appoint the State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction at a salary determined by such board. 
POINT II 
THE GOVERNOR AND THE COMMISSION OF FI-
NANCE DO NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO REDUCE AP-
PROPRIATIONS MADE BY THE LEGISLATURE FOR 
PUBLIC SCHOOL PURPOSES. 
The argument of the Appellants to the above find-
ing of the trial court appears to be Point V of the Appel-
lant's brief. The trial court did not make a finding that 
the budgetary control law was unconstitutional. The 
issue stated by the Appellants and the argument made 
ignores the real issue as stated above. The argument 
is based upon broad generalities of constitutionality, 
and innuendoes and inferences that the Board of Educa-
tion is a spendthrift board operating under the concep-
tion that it must spend all money appropriated to it. 
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The issue here discussed is not academic. The defendants 
have in fact on different occasions openly ordered re-
ductions in amounts appropriated by the Legislatur~ 
and have claimed nothing short of a continuing veto 
power. 
The statutory law pertaining to the relative author-
ity of the parties hereto is as follows: 
Section 53-3-2, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"The State Board of Education shall be 
charged with the administration of the system 
of public instruction, and with general superin-
tendence of the district schools of the State 
and of the school revenue set apart and appropri-
ated for their support." 
By Section 53-3-7, U.C.A., 1953, the State Superin-
tendent with the approval of the State Board of Educa-
tion shall prepare and submit a proposed budget for sub-
mission by the Governor to the Legislature. 
Section 53-3-8, U.C.A., 1953, provides: 
"The State Auditor shall transfer to the state 
general fund from the uniform school fund to the 
credit of the State Board of Education the amount 
designated by the Legislature for the operation 
of the office of the State Superintendent and the 
State Board of Education • • • ." 
Section 6-±-1-16, U.C.A., 1953, provides that on the 
first day of earh nwnth or as soon thereafter as the bills 
for the expenses for the previous month have been audit-
ed, the governing board of each state institution shall 
74 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
make a requisition upon the State Auditor for a warrant 
in sufficient amount to pay the bills so audited and 
thereupon: 
"the state auditor shall draw his warrant against 
the appropriation made for such institution for 
the amount named in the requisition in favor of 
the treasurer of the governing board of the insti-
tution* * *." 
Section 53-7-3, U.C.A., 1953, provides that it shall 
be the duty of the state auditor to notify the Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction of the actual amount of 
money available in the uniform school fund. The State 
Board of Education shall apportion and distribute said 
fund among the several school districts, the Junior Col-
leges ... Upon certification by the Superintendent of 
Public Instruction as to the amount of apportionment 
the State Auditor: 
"shall forthwith draw his warrant on the State 
Treasurer in favor of each of the respective school 
districts and the institutions herein mentioned 
for the amount to which each is entitled .... " 
Section 63-2-20, U.C.A., 1953, provides: 
"The Commission of Finance shall exercise 
budgetary control over all state departments and 
agencies. The Commission shall require the head 
of each department to submit to it and to the 
Governor not later than May 15 of each year, a 
work program for the ensuing fiscal year and may 
at any time require any department to submit a 
work program for any other period * * * ." 
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The law then provides that the work program shall 
state all appropriations and other funds available to the 
particular department. It states that the aggregate of 
the allotments shall not exceed the total appropriations 
·or other funds available to the department for the fiscal 
year requested. This section provides that the budget 
officer under the direction of the governor shall revise, 
alter, decrease, or change such allotments before ap-
proving the same. 
It is the contention of the Defendants that they have 
unlimited authority and power to revise, decrease or 
alter proposed expenditures of funds by the State Board 
of Education. 
It is the contention of the State Board of Education 
that the budgetary control specified in the foregoing 
section only authorizes the Commission of Finance, the 
budget officer, and the Governor to review the proposed 
expenditures of funds to dete-rmine that expenditures do 
not exceed appropriations and other available funds and 
that the proposed expenditures are for public purposes 
within the scope of the authority of the agency involved. 
Article 7, Section 8 of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah specifies the procedure for the enactment of a 
law requiring that bills passed by the Legislature must 
be presented to the Governor for his approval. The 
section specifies the veto power of the Governor and 
further provides that once a bill has been approved by 
the Governor or passed over the Governor's objection, 
the same becomes law. In spite of this section of the 
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Constitution the Governor claims to have a continuing 
veto power over funds appropriated by the Legislature. 
The State Board of Education, as provided in Title 
53-33, U.C.A., 1953, has the direct responsibility of the 
management, supervision and control of Weber College,' 
Dixie Junior College and Carbon College. (Stipulation, 
Counts 2 and 3, paragraph 7) 
The thirtieth session of the Legislature of the State 
of Utah passed .an appropriation bill by the terms of 
which $1,163,280 were allocated to the Weber Junior Col-
lege. (Session Laws 1953, Chapter 136, Item 88) The 
amount of this appropriation was for a biennium and, 
therefore, the amount available for a fiscal year was the 
sum of $581,640. The amount appropriated became law 
and was not vetoed by the Governor. However, on June 
26, 1953, a letter to the Treasurer of We her College writ-
ten by the budget officer at the direction of the Governor 
provided as follows : 
"Dear Dr. Foulger: 
"Governor Lee has reviewed your 'Work 
Program' for the first fiscal year of the 1953-55 
biennium for the period beginning July 1, 1953 
and ending June 30,1954. 
"Under the provisions of Title 63-2-20, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, the Governor deemed it 
advisable to reduce the amount of the appropria-
tion available from $581,640.00 to $502,612.09, a 
net decrease of $79,027.91." (Exhibit 2, Page 9-a) 
This was a clear attempt by the Governor to reduce 
the amount appropriatea by the Legislature for Weber 
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Junior College. To permit the reduction would be to hold 
that the Governor has a continuing veto power. The 
Legislature after having studied and investigated the 
needs of the various institutions and having made ap-
propriations therefor would be helpless to insure that 
those appropriations would ultimately be made available 
to the institution. Even if the Governor vetoed items 
in the appropriations bill and subsequent thereto the 
Legislature passed the act over the Governor's veto the 
Governor, as claimed by the Defendants, would still have 
the power and authority to subsequently reduce the 
amount appropriated as attempted in the case of Weber 
Junior College. 
On June 8, 1952, Weber Junior College was advised 
that a work program for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 
1952, had been reviewed under the direction of Governor 
Lee and that there w.as available for \Yeber Junior Col-
lege during that fiscal year the sum of $695,950. (Exhibit 
2, Page 1) On February 25, 1953, Weber Junior College 
was advised that out of the work program approved for 
the fiscal year there was available for use during the 
month of April. 1953, the sun1 of $57,000. Pursuant to 
this notification, \Veber Junior College specified the 
"Object Classification" for which the sun1 of $57,000 
should be issued. (Exhibit ~. Page 2) HoweYer, on 
April 1, 1953, the Treasurer of \Y eber Junior College 
received a cmnn1unication fro1n the budget officer in 
part as follows: 
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"Dear Dr. Foulger: 
Pursuant to Title 63-2-20, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, Governor J. Bracken Lee deemed 
advisable to decrease your requested allotments 
for operation and maintenance of your Adminis-
tration Division for April, the first month of the 
ensuing quarter, from $57,000.00 to $52,000.00, a 
net decrease of $5,000.00" (Exhibit 2, Page 4) 
If he could reduce the amount available by the sum 
of $5,000.00, there is nothing to stop him from completely 
eliminating the amount involved. 
Weber Junior College protested the forced reduction 
of $5,000.00. It was pointed out that the purchasing de-
partment had made purchases in reliance upon the funds 
to be made available and that in order to secure discount 
privileges bulk purchasing had been made for which 
payments were due ,and owing. The Governor was fur-
ther advised as follows: 
"The reduced allotment release of $52,000 for 
the month of April would not even meet our sala-
ries." (Exhibit 2, Page 6) 
Although it is intimated that the action of the Gov-
ernor was to prevent the wasteful spending of unused 
surpluses at the end of a fiscal period, this assertion is 
refuted by the fact that the progr.am was approved on a 
yearly basis and the table of actual expenditures shows 
that the average expense during the months of December 
through ~larch for the years 1951-1952 and 1952-1953 
were $62,710 and $63,602, respectively. (Exhibit 2, Page 
7) 
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Similar reductions in the amount appropriated to 
Carbon Junior College and Dixie Junior College were 
required by the Governor on April 1, 1953, notwith-
standing prior approval of the fiscal year work program. 
(Exhibit 2, Pages 10, 14) Carbon Junior College had a 
considerable amount of accounts payable for purchases 
which required payment. 
Dixie Junior College protested the order by a letter 
to the budget examiner in part as follows : 
"Actual monthly expenditures for contracted 
salaries alone are more than the total amount 
you propose for operation. In fact, the $9200.00 
indicated in our request is $800.00 to $1000.00 less 
than is required to meet current salary obliga-
tions. * * *" (Exhibit 2, Page 15) 
By the laws of Utah, 1953, Chapter 136, Item 85, 
Carbon Junior College was appropriated by the Legis-
lature the sum of $240,000 for the biennium. On J nne 26, 
1953, the president of that college received notification 
that the Governor was ordering a reduction for the fiscal 
year from $120,000 to $107,635.84, a net decrease of $12,-
364.16. (Exhibit 2, Page 13-A) A similar reduction was 
ordered by the Governor with reference to the funds 
appropriated by the Legislature and permitted to become 
law by the Governor for use by Dixie Junior College. 
(Exhibit 2, Page 14) 
In 1949 Governor Lee attempted to veto an item in 
the appropriation bill .appropriating $20,000 to the State 
Board of Education and referred to as a research fund. 
Subsequent thereto a district court case was filed on the 
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part of the Utah State Agricultural College challenging 
the validity of a similar veto with reference to extension 
service funds. The court held that such a veto was void. 
The case was not appealed to the Supreme Court. 
Based upon the holding in that case a request was 
made to the budget director of the State Finance Com-
mission for the allocation for a fiscal year of $10,000 
of the $20,000 fund. (Exhibit 2, Page 21) The Governor 
still refused to make available any of these funds unless 
the State Department of Education would agree to 
certain terms demanded by the Governor. (Exhibit 2, 
Pages 22-38) 
Can the educational institutions properly function 
and meet their responsibilities and liabilities if one man 
has the absolute authority to veto at any time the funds 
allocated to those institutions? 
Article 5, Section 1, of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah provides : 
"The powers of the government of the State 
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct depart-
ments, the legislative, the executive, and the judi-
cial, and no person charged with the exercise of 
powers properly belonging to one of these depart-
ments, shall exercise any function appertaining to 
either of the others, except in the cases herein 
expressly directed or permitted." 
It is fundamental that it is within the jurisdiction 
of the Legislature to enact laws and appropriate funds 
for the various state functions. The Governor is given 
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some control over legislative enactments by virtue of the 
power to veto proposed legislative enactments. However, 
if the Governor fails to veto a bill or if a bill is passed 
over the Governor's veto, the same becomes law and there-
after the Governor is bound by the terms of the law 
and cannot thereafter alter the same. 
It is fundamental that the Legislature may delegate 
to administrative agencies the duty of determining when 
a law shall take effect and that administrative agencies 
may prescribe rules and regulations within the scope of 
a gener.al standard prescribed by the Legislature. 
It is equally fundamental that the Legislature may 
not delegate to the executive branch of government the 
power and authority to enact laws or to prescribe how 
and when laws shall take effect solely 'vi thin the discre. 
tion of the executive agency. The arrogate who stops 
payment of vouchers against appropriated funds bec-ause 
of the power to appoint and hire and fire disbursing 
officers destroys constitutional government. By dilatory 
tactics, lulling into security, refusal to be bound by judi-
cial opinion or decision, money appropriated is not forth-
coming, promises are broken, confidence is lost, integrity 
destroyed, .and the purposes and divisions of government 
are frustrated. 
The Utah cases have recognized the diYision of go\-
ernment in connection with the delegation of authority 
by the Legislature. 
In roung u. Salt Lake City (1902), 2-1 Ftah 321, 67 
Pac. 1066, the Supreme Court was required to construe 
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Article 5, Section 1, of the Constitution. The court cited 
the well recognized rule as follows: 
"It will be conceded that, while the Legisla-
ture c.annot delegate power to make laws, it may 
still make laws to take effect upon the ascertain-
ment of certain facts and conditions, and may 
delegate the duty to determine the existence of 
such facts to some other branch of the govern-
ment." 
In the case of State v. Gross, 79 Utah 559, 11 Pac. 
2d 340, the court recognized the rule cited by the e.arlier 
case and quoted with approval the following language 
from a United States Supreme Court case: 
"In creating such an administration agency, 
the legislature to prevent its being a pure deleg.a-
tion of legislative power, must enjoin upon it a 
certain course of procedure and certain rules of 
decision in the performance of its function." 
The court further stated : 
"The Legislature may not delegate the power 
to enact a law, or to declare what the law sh.all 
be or to exercise an unrestricted discretion in ap-
plying a law; but it may enact a law complete in 
itself designed to accomplish a general public 
purpose, .and may expressly authorize designated 
officials within definite valid limitations to pro-
vide rules and regulations for the complete opera.; 
tion and enforcement of the law within its ex-
pressed general purpose." 
A more recent discussion of the issue of the delega-
tion of legislative authority is contained in Revre v. 
Trade Commission, 113 Utah 155, 192 Pac. 2d 563. Th~ 
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Supreme Court affirms the fundamental propositions 
concerning the delegation of legislative authority hereto-
fore discussed. 
The Department of Finance has no authority toes-
tablish budgets for other state agencies or to dominate 
the financial policies of any of the departments of gov-
ernment. 
The State of Louisiana in 1942 established a Depart-
ment of Finance which was directed to exercise budget-
ary control over the financial affairs of the various state 
agencies. The law as cited in the case shows the close 
similarity of the law of Louisiana with that of the State 
of Utah. 
In Wall v Close, 14 So. 2d 19, an act establishing 
a financial code for the State of Louisiana to be admin-
istered by the Department of Finance was construed. 
The law provided for a Director of Finance and a Budget 
Officer who would aid the executive departments and the 
Governor in preparing an executive budget to be pre-
sented to the Legislature for an appropriation. The con-
stitutionality of the act was challenged and in affirming 
the constitutionality of the act and reversing a lower 
court's decision that the act was unconstitutional, two 
judges dissenting, the Supre1ne Court stated as follows: 
"Section 10 of Title 3 provides that after the 
passage of the appropriation and revenue acts, 
'the Budget Officer under the direction of the 
Director of Finance shall cause to be prepared 
a complete state budget for each year of the en-
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suing biennium.' This does not mean that the 
Budget Officer, under the direction of the Direc-
tor of Finance, is granted power and authority 
to make up a financial budget for the state." (Em-
phasis added) 
The court then goes on to state that it is just the duty 
of the Budget Officer to compile a statement setting forth 
in detail the financial plan for the executive budget as 
modified and adopted by the Legislature. It is further 
stated: 
"Clearly, therefore, the functions of the Di-
rector of Finance and the officers serving in or 
under that department are to assist the governor 
and the legislature in gathering the data which 
are to form the basis of the appropriations for 
the different departments and agencies of the 
state. In no way may these officers dictate or 
dominate the financial policies of either the execu-
tive or the legislative department of the state. 
The Department of Finance is in no sense, there-
fore, a department of the executive branch of the 
government. It is no more so than would be an 
expert accountant or auditor employed by the 
executive department of the state to gather data 
necessary to guide the department in formulat-
ing its financial plans." (Emphasis added) 
The act further provided that no warrants could be 
issued upon the State Treasury without first receiving 
approval of the Director of Finance. Settling of claims 
was also apparently granted to the Commission of Fin-
ance, but the holding of the Court is to the effect that 
such activities were procedural only or ministerial and 
were established for the purposes of accounting and were 
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not intended to grant supervisory power to the Depart-
ment of Finance. 
The Governor does not have the authority in veto. 
ing a bill to reduce the .amount of the appropriation, but 
rather he can either approve or disapprove the entire 
amount. It is therefore held that the Legislature can-
not authorize the Governor to do indirectly what he is 
prohibited by the Constitution from doing directly, name-
ly, reduce the amount of an appropriation. And gen-
erally it is held that an attempted substitution of the 
judgment of executive officers for that of the legislative 
body constitutes a usurpation of legislative functions 
which cannot be permitted under constitutional provi-
sions establishing state representative government with 
three coordinate departments. 
Where the Legislature has attempted to specify the 
terms under which a Governor would have authority to 
reduce appropriations the court has held such delegation 
to be unconstitutional. 
In State ex rel Crable vs. Carter, 103 Pac. 2d 518, 
( Oklahmna), an action was brought by members of the 
State Department of Education and the State Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction against the State Auditor 
seeking a Writ of :Mandan1us to require the auditor to 
draw warrants against the State Treasurer for payment 
of claims of n1mnbers of the State Depnrhnent of Public 
Instruction. It was alleged that the general departmental 
appropriation bill allocated to the State Superintendent 
of Public Instruction funds for traveling expenses and 
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that there was an unexpended balance in said fund with 
which to pay the claims. The state auditor refused to 
approve the claims and so notified the Superintendent of 
Public Instruction. The reasons assigned for rejecting 
the claims were as follows: 
"Claims listed here are rejected for the rea-
son that they are in excess of the amount allocated 
by the governor for the first three quarters of the 
present fiscal year under the authorization of 
House Bill No. 627 -17th Legislature and in excess 
of the amount allocated to April 6, 1940." 
Another claim was also included in the suit hy of-
ficers and employees of the State Board of Agriculture 
and the auditor had refused these claims on the basis 
that the governor had instructed the defendant not to 
approve any such claims made against said appropria-
tion. The statute giving the governor authority to ap-
prove quarterly budgets for state departments or institu-
tions is set out in full in the report and is very similar 
to the statutes of the State of Utah pertaining to budget-
ary control, however, this statute limits the governor's 
authority to disapprove quarterly work programs only 
if he believes that there will not be sufficient revenue to 
meet the appropriations. 
The Oklahoma court stated: 
"Having determined that the appropriations 
made in the departmental appropriation bill are 
valid and binding and having the force and ef-
fect of law, the question arises whether or not the 
Legislature may delegate to the Governor, under 
certain conditions, the power to .annul or veto, 
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in whole or in part, any item contained in such 
appropriation bill. Petitioners urge that such 
question was settled by this court in the case of 
State ex rel Hudson v. Carter, 167 Okl. 32, 27 
P. 2d 617, 624 91 A.L.R. 1497. In that case the 
court was concerned with an appropriation to the 
Corporation Commission .and a provision inserted 
in the departmental appropriation bill providing 
that said funds were 'to be expended by and with 
the approval of the Governor.' Therein it was 
said: ' * * * A provision requiring the approval 
of the Governor of the expenditure of such an 
appropriation is void for three reasons: First, 
there is no .authority of law for the Governor to 
approve an expenditure of money appropriated 
for the purpose of enabling the Corporation Com-
mission to perform the constitutional duty requir-
ed to be performed by it under the provisions of 
Section 29, Article 9, ·supra; second, the attempt 
to authorize the Governor to exercise such power 
is void under the provisions of Section 56, Article 
5, supra; and, third, because the Legislature is 
without authority to confer the power upon the 
Governor to do indirectly a thing which the Gover-
nor could not be directly empowered to do, that 
is, to reduce an item in .an appropriation bill. We 
held to that effect in Peebly vs. Childres, State 
Auditor, 95 Okl. 40, 217 P. 10-±9. See, also Regents 
of State University vs. Trapp, Auditor, 28 Okl. 
83, 113 P. 910, and Carter, State A.uditor vs. Rath-
burn, 85 Old. 251, 209 P. 9-±-±. • • • ' 
"(1-3) Since the power of the Governor to 
veto items in an appropriation bill is liinited by 
the Constitution any atte1npt on the part of the 
Legislature to enlarge the exercise of that power 
and to r hange the specified mode or 1nanner of its 
exercise would contravene the constitutional pro-
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YlSIOn fixing the limit of such power. It 
therefore appears that the statement made in 
the case of State ex rei v. Carter, supra, that the 
Legislature is without authority to empower the 
Governor to reduce an item in the appropriation 
bill is fundamentally correct and is controlling of 
the question here presented. 
"This conclusion, as we view it, is in harmony 
with our fundamental concept of government re-
lating to the division of powers. The respons-
ibility of preventing the excessive expenditure of 
such funds rests primarily upon the Legislature 
who can refuse to appropriate such excess funds; 
but if appropriated, the responsibility thereupon 
shifts to the Governor who by the exercise of his 
constitutionally granted veto power, at the time 
and in the manner prescribed and limited by the 
Constitution, can prevent such excessive expedi-
ture. However desirable it may be to prevent the 
expenditure of funds in excess of available re-
venues, the courts must scrupulously maintain 
the powers delegated to the legislative and execu-
tive branches of government, but at the same time 
1nust as carefully maintain the constitutional re-
strictions imposed upon the exercise of those 
powers, for herein lies the safeguard of represen-
tative government. liVe find nothing in our Con-
stittttion which indicates that the framers thereof 
contemplated that the Governor might be granted 
a continuing veto power which, under any circum-
stances or conditions, might be exercised long 
after the Legislature has adjourned. (Emphasis 
added) 
The court therefore held that a Writ of Mandamus 
would properly lie against the auditor since the reasons 
for denying the claims were that the Governor had not 
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given his approval, the court having held that the Gover. 
nor could not approve or disapprove claims upon ap-
propriations made to the various departments. 
The case of State v. Erickson, supra, construed a 
section of the ~Iontana law which gave to the State 
Board of Examiners broad power and authority 
over the expenditures made by the educational institu-
tions of the state. Part of that law is as follows: 
Section 850, Revised Codes of 1921 : 
"The state board of examiners * * * shall 
have supervision and control of all expenditures 
of all moneys, appropriated or received for the 
use of said (educational) institutions from any 
and all sources, other than that received under 
and by virtue of the acts of Congress * * * shall 
let all contracts * * * and shall audit all claims 
to be paid from any moneys, * * * but * * * shall 
have authority to confer upon the executive boards 
of such institutions such power and authority in 
contracting current expenses, and in auditing, 
paying and reporting bills for salaries or other 
expenses incurred in connection with such institu-
tions, as may be deemed by said state board of 
examiners to be to the best interest of said in-
stitution." (Emphasis added) 
The court after citing the foregoing law and other 
sections in connection therewith recognized that the 
Board of Exan1iners had been granted by the Legislature 
certain authority and discretion oYer expenditures of 
funds appropriated by the Legislature. However, th~ 
court stated in this connection as follows: 
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"While this board is given superv1swn and 
control over the expenditures of moneys approp-
riated or received for the use of the educational 
institution of the state, this power does not 
mtthorize an arbitrary reduction by the board of 
valid appropriations and authorized expenditures 
from available funds applicable to such appropria-
tions and expenditures which have been duly made 
and authorized by the Legislative Assembly and 
have received the approval of the Governor. Such 
attempted substitution of the judgment of execu-
tive officers for that of the legislative body con-
stitutes a usurpation of legislative functions which 
cannot be permitted under our constitutional divi-
sion of state government into its three co-ordinate 
departments; the authority to do so was denied 
the governor in the exercise of his veto power in 
Mills v. Porter, 222 P. 428, 69 Mont. 325, 35 
A.L.R. 592, and there is much less reason for sus-
taining the exercise of such power by an execu-
tive board . When the Legislative Assembly has 
expressed its solemn judgment as to the amount 
necessary for the support and maintenance of an 
institution for the fiscal year, and in doing so 
has kept within the restrictions imposed by the 
Constitution both as to such general appropria-
tion and its appropriations generally for such 
year, the executive and judicial departments of 
the state must bow to that judgment." (Emphasis 
added) 
These cases point out why the Legislature could not 
if it so intended delegate to the executive branch of the 
government the power and authority to reduce approp-
riations contained in a bill which has become law. 
It is submitted that it was not the intention of the 
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Legislature to so provide when they enacted the law 
establishing budgetary control Consider for instance the 
emergency legislation during the depression. Section 
90-0-2, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, as amended by 
Chapter 78, Laws of Utah 1933, provided for budgetary 
control in substantially the same manner as the present 
law. More particularly the law stated that if the Gover-
nor deems necessary he may "revise, alter, decrease or 
change such allotments." In spite of this law the Legis~ 
lature in 1933 enacted Chapter 72 of the Laws of Utah 
1933, entitled "Emergency Power of Governor Over 
State Revenue." (Stipulation, Counts 2 and 3, paragraph 
15) By the terms of this law the Governor was author-
ized to require periodic reports of proposed expenditures 
of each department and to compel reductions in expendi-
tures. The law likewise gave broad authority over em-
ployment and suspension of personnel and suspension or 
ternporary elimination of certain agencie-s and functions 
of the government. However, this authority was only 
granted with certain restrictions and any reductions of 
expenditures or suspension of services were only per-
mitted for a temporary period. Had the Legislature felt 
that under the budgetary control law the Governor had 
the necessary authority to reduce appropriations, etc., 
it would have been unnecessary to enact these emergency 
powers. The law giving the Governor this authority has 
been repealed by the Legislature. (Session Laws of Utah 
1947, Chapter 136.) 
Closer exa1nination of the budgetary .control law 
likewise shows that the Legislature did not intend that 
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the Governor, the Department of Finance or the budget 
officer should have unlimited authority to revise, alter, 
decrease or change the allotments. The act, after pro-
viding that the various departments submit to the De-
partment of Finance their respective work programs and 
specifying that the budget officer under the direction of 
the Governor could revise, alter or decrease the allot-
ments, then states: 
" * • * The aggregate of such allotments shall 
not exceed that total appropriations or other funds 
from any source whatsoever made available to 
said department for the fiscal year in question." 
... (63-2-20 UCA 1953) 
The foregoing definitely establishes a rule or guide 
to be followed by the Governor and the budget officer 
in reviewing the work programs. The law then provides 
that the approved work program shall be transmitted to 
the department in question and to the state auditor and 
then states : 
" • * * The Commission of Finance shall there-
upon permit all expenditures to be made from the 
appropriations or other funds from any source 
whatsoever on the basis of such allotments and 
not otherwise * * *" ( 63-2-20 UCA, 1953) 
The Defendants' main argument in answer to the 
proposition advanced by the Intervenor is based on in-
sinuation and inferences that the Board of Education 
constitutes a bureaucratic agency insulated from the 
electorate and indifferent to public opinion concerned 
primarily with wasteful and extravagant spending. 
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Starting with this assumption, the Defendants then argue 
the policy reasons for the establishment of a financial 
code. The Intervenor has no quarrel with the proposi-
tion that it is a good business practice for a depart. 
ment to estimate its financial needs and to allocate the 
expenditure of its funds based upon a fiscal work pro-
gram which takes into consideration all of the funds 
which are available to the department However, such 
an argument evades the issue here presented as to the 
authority of the Governor and budget officer to reduce 
appropriations made by the Legislature to another de-
partment of government. 
Only two cases are cited by the Defendants in answer 
to the respondents on this issue. The first case is Che.~ 
vs. Utah State Build,ing Commission, 93 utah 538, 74 
Pac. 687. This case involved a supposed ambiguity in 
the statute appropriating money for state building. The 
appropriation, contingent upon many happenings, was 
made to the Governor. \Vhether there were to be any 
funds and the allocation of those funds depended on 
many contingencies .... <\s was stated at Page 553 of the 
Utah Report, the money was to come from emergency 
relief funds commencing at a future date. Secondly, 
from the 1noney received $3,200,000 had to be first allo-
cated for welfare purposes. Thirdly, any expenditures 
for Carbon College were dependent upon the taxing units 
providing a suitable can1pus, and fourthly, a site was 
to be procured by the state for a tuberculosis sanitarium. 
r_rhe decision as to how th0 lUOney lnight be spent would 
be further influenced by the availability of federal funds 
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to be used in addition to the state funds. In view of this 
factual situation, the legislature felt that it was required 
to leave to the discretion of the Governor the actual al-
location of the funds once they became available. The 
Governor, in fact, had allocated the funds. 
The issue therefore is substantially different from 
the one here presented. In the present case the appropria-
tion is not to the Governor, but rather to a constitutional 
agency. In the present case the Governor has not ap-
proved the appropriations, but rather has attempted to 
decrease specific appropriations made by the Legisla-
ture. Third, the issue as stated by the court above gives 
no support for a consideration of when and under what 
conditions authority may be delegated to the Governor 
over financial matters. The Defendants quote a part of 
a short statement by the court which would tend to lead 
one to believe that the court was deciding that the Legis-
lature had unlimited authority with reference to the sub-
ject of appropriations. However, the entire quotation 
concerning this subject is as follows: 
"No attack has been made on the p.articular 
method of appropriations; that is where the whole 
sum is appropriated to the Governor and he is 
vested with discretion to reduce, transfer, or elimi-
nate items or parts thereof. It is sufficient to 
say that in the absence of constitutional provision 
to the contr.ary the power of the Legislature on 
the subject of appropriations is plenary." 
The court by its very statement indicates that there 
was no real issue raised by the pleadings and arguments 
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in this case on the issue of granting authority to the 
Governor and contented itself to make a general o·bserva-
tion in this regard. The observation so made stated that 
"in the absence of a constitutional provision to the con-
trary." It is submitted that in this case there are con-
stitutional provisions to the contrary. The section of the 
constitution dividing the state government into three spe-
cific branches and the section of the constitution defining 
the veto power of the Governor are contrary to the sup-
posed authority granted in the Finance Commission law. 
The only other case cited by the Defendants on this 
point is State ex rel Boyle vs. Ernst, 195 Wash. 214, 78 
Pac. 2d 526. This was a suit in mandamus to compel 
payment of welfare funds. The law appropriating the 
funds stated that the expenditure could not be made ex-
cept upon allotments approved by the Governor. In this 
case the petitioner alleged that the Governor had not 
approved the allotments. This case does not raise the 
issue presented before the court. It does not involve an 
attempt by a Governor to reduce amount of appropria-
tions made by a Legislature. Rather, it involves the dis-
bursetnent of funds appropriated to a statutory admin-
istrative agency and involves the n1ethods of expendi-
tures. The precise issue in the 'V ashington case was 
whether a writ of mandmnus would be issued to compel 
expenditure of welfare funds without the Governor's ap-
prov.al. That issue, as has been stated, is substantially 
different from a situation where the Governor is at-
tmnpting to reduce a specific appropriation made to a 
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separate department, not involving statutory administra-
tive agencies. 
Defendants have .argued that the terms "revise, alter, 
decrease or change" can have no meaning if they are 
qualified by the further statement that the allotments 
cannot exceed "the total appropriation or other funds 
from any source whatever made available to the de-
partment for the fiscal year in question." Such is not 
the case. A department may desire to revise, alter, de-
crease or change specific allocations contained in the 
work program by transferring funds from one proposed 
expenditure to another type of expenditure, or for ex-
pending a larger part of its appropriations during one 
fiscal year than during another period of the biennium. 
If the budgetary control law of the State of Utah 
is to be held constitutional, it must be limited to con-
ferring only ministerial duties upon the Department of 
Finance and not as conferring the right to reduce ap-
propriations made by the Legislature. The law as con 
tained in the Utah, Oklahoma and Montana cases .as 
reviewed above will not support a statutory construction 
amounting to a holding that .an unlimited, continuing veto 
power has been delegated to the Defendants. The Utah 
Legislature obviously did not intend such a delegation. 
The budgetary control law still serves a useful and 
needed purpose and gives full faith to the legislative 
intent by holding th.at the authority therein conferred 
is limited to the ministeral function of aiding in budget 
planning and the pre-auditing of expenditures to deter-
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nune that they are within appropriations and are for 
public purposes. 
POINT III 
IF THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OR FINANCE COM-
MISSION HAVE ANY AUTHORITY OVER THE APPROPRI-
ATED FUNDS OF THE BOARD OF EDU0ATION, IT IS 
MINISTERIAL. 
"\Ve have heretofore presented the argument that 
the Board of Examiners does not have authority to dis-
approve disbursement of funds by the State Board of 
Education for public school purposes. For the purposes 
of this point, if there be some control over disbursements 
of the Board of Education, the power or authority given 
the Board of Examiners or the Finance Commission 
is li1nited to the performance of ministerial acts. Such 
authority must not violate the power of the Board of 
Education under the constitutional provision creating 
it. 
The Board of Education admits that it must follow 
proper accounting and auditing procedures to safeguard 
the expenditure and disbursement of public. funds en-
trusted to it. However, to have the power to supervise 
and control the public. sehool system it 1nust have author" 
ity and discretion to determine how the money shall be 
spent for public. school purposes. 
It should be noted that the constitutional section 
established the Board of Examiners and defining its 
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powers is divided into two sections. The first states that 
they shall have power "to examine all claims against 
the state * * * and perform such other duties as may be 
prescribed by law; and no claim against the state, * * * 
shall be passed upon by the legislature without having 
been considered and acted upon by the s1aid Board o~ 
Examiners." It will be noted as to the first type of clain1s 
which do not require presentation to the legisla,ture, it 
states .the Board of Examiners shall have power to ex-
amine only, but as to the second type of claim, which 
must he presented to the legislature, it states they shall 
he considered and acted upon by the said Board of 
Examiners. It would, therefore, appear that as to dis-
bursements by the Board of Education - assuming such 
claims must be presented to the Board of Examiners --
the Board of Examiners would only have power to ex-
amine, which construction is consistent with the Nevada 
cases heretofore discussed. 
The Commission of Finance, created in 1941, has 
authority to pre-audit disbursement of funds. Prior to 
this time the Board of Examiners by statute had been 
performing auditing and accounting functions. The In-
tervenors admit that the transfer of these duties could 
be properly made to the Department of Finance. But 
whether or not the Department of Finance is acting in 
the capacity of an agent of the Board of Examiners as 
contended by defendants, its authority is limited to a 
determination of whether or not expenditures are for 
public purposes and are within an appropriation made 
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by the Legislature. This is true whether the auditing 
agency is created either by constitution or by statute. 
In the ~iassachusetts case of W illar v. Common. 
wealth, 9 NE 2nd 405, 297 Mass. 527, the Court held that 
the Governor and the fiscal agency given control over fi-
nancial matters of the state had the duty to insure that 
payments out of the public treasury were not made ex-
cept for public purposes and in accordance with the law. 
This was an action involving a dispute as to the authority 
of the Department of Public Works in relation to the 
authority of the Governor and the council which was 
given authority over financial matters of the state. Con-
cerning this dispute the court stated: 
"* * *It was not the purpose to give the Gov-
ernor and Council power to veto contracts or 
purchases lawfully made by authorized officers 
or to refuse to honor debts and obligations law-
fully incurred." 
In the Ohio case of State v. Defen-bacher, 91 NB 
2nd 512, 153 Ohio St. 268, the Court stated: 
"In the event there is money in a state fund; 
available for the purpose for which it is sought, it 
is the ministerial duty of the Director of Finance, 
upon proper submission of an incumbrance esti-
mate or certificate for the purpose of incumbering 
such 1noney for such purpose, to make the certifi-
cation required by Section 2288-2 General Code. 
The discharge of this duty may be compelled by 
mandamus." 
(See also State v. Ferguson, 50 NE 2nd 992, 142 
Ohio St. 179) 
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In the Indiana case of State v. Clamme, 134 NE 676, 
80 Ind. A pp. 14 7, the court held the Legislature could not 
create a department with power to supervise and control 
public officers in the performance of their duties. In 
this case the court stated as follows: 
" ( 8) The department of inspection and su-
pervision of public offices was created for the 
purpose of examining the accounts of such public 
officers as handle public funds. From the Legis-
lation relating to that department, it clearly ap-
pears that its powers and duties are limited to the 
subject of accounting and reporting. * * * 
"There is absolutely nothing in any of the 
legislation relating to this subject which tends in 
the slightest degree to authorize the department 
to control the discretion of any public officer, 
administrative board, or other governmental 
agency whatsoever. Indeed, the Legislature could 
not create a department and endow it with power 
to supervise and control public officers in the 
performance of their duties generally, without 
amending all the laws relating to the powers and 
duties of the officers of the state and of every 
administrative subdivision of the state. It is to 
be presumed that if the Legislature were to at-
tempt such a comprehensive and serious project, 
it would not be unmindful of constitutional pro-
vision, State Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 19.21." 
In the Florida case of State ex rel W. R. Clark 
Printing & Binding Co., Inc., et al v. Lee, State Comp-
troller, 163 So. 702, 121 Fla. 320, the court in construing 
a constitutional provision said : 
"Section 25 of Article 4 of the State Constitu-
tion, vesting the comptroller with power to ex-
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amine, audit, adjust and settle accounts of State 
Officers, confers upon the comptroller the right, 
and imposes upon him the duty to see to it that 
all disbursements of public moneys are authorized 
by a legal appropriation, that the payment of a 
particular item violates no positive prohibition 
against payment, expressly or impliedly forbidden 
by law. That section and articles vest t·he comp-
troller with no supervisory authority to veto or 
disallow items of expenditure for which a lawful 
appropriation had been made by the Legislature 
and the payment of which, as approved by the 
responsible officer or agency incurring the obliga-
tion under statutory power so to do, violates no 
provision of law." 
(See also State v. Gay, 46 So. 2nd 711, Florida 1950.) 
In the Illinois case of People ex rel State Board of 
Agriculture v. Brady, 115 NE 204, 277 Ill. 124, the court 
construed another constitutional provision by saying: 
"The Constitution created the office of the 
Auditor of Public Accounts, on whose warrant 
alone money was to be drawn from the Treasury. 
He was made the official examiner of accounts 
and claims against the state, which must be veri-
fied by him. The duty to determine whether a 
particular claim constitutes an obligation against 
the state is implied by the title of his office, and 
it is only when he draws his warrant for what he 
finds to be a proper charge against the state that 
it can be paid by the Treasurer. It is not within 
the power of the General Assembly to deprive 
the Auditor of Public Accounts of the power con-
ferred upon him by the Constitution to audit 
claims and charges against the state created in 
pursuance of an appropriation made by law. If a 
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sum of money, or so much t-h.ereof as may be nec-
essary for a specific purpose, is appropriated by 
law and paid over to any officer, board, or other 
attthority authorized to make the expenditures, 
then the board, officer or authority becomes the 
one to determine the proper obligations of the 
state instead of the Auditor of Public Accounts, 
while the Constitution contemplates that, the ex-
penditure having been made or the obligation in-
curred, an account shall be submitted to the audi-
tor for his examination and verification before 
any money is drawn from the state treasury." 
(Emphasis added) 
In the Arizona case of Proctor v. Hunt, 29 Pac. 2nd 
1058 (Arizona 1934) the court stated that an auditor 
had no discretion in the issuance of warrants if the 
voucher showed that the funds were for public purposes 
and were drawn against duly made appropriations. The 
law in Arizona as to the duties of auditor states as 
follows: 
"The auditor shall: (1) Audit, adjust and 
settle the amount of claims against the state 
payable out of funds of the state. • • ., 
The court in following the prior decisions of the 
court stated: 
"In the present case, the v.arious claims were 
approved by the Governor of Arizona, the head of 
the department for which the appropriations, 
which it is contended justified the expenditure 
of the money in question, were made. We think 
under these circumstances that unless it appeared 
upon their face, that the claims, as approved by 
the Governor, were not in proper form or not for 
a public purpose, connected with the activities 
103 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the Governor's office, for which an appropri-
ation had been made, it was the duty of the audi-
tor, enforceable by mandamus, to issue a warrant 
therefor." 
The s.ame result was reached in Ward v. Frohmiller, 
100 Pac. 2nd 167, 55 Ariz. 202, on a claim for out of state 
travel. See also Fairfield v. W. J. Corbett Hardware 
Co., 215 Pac. 510, 25 Ariz. 199. 
In the ~fissouri case of State v. Hackmann, (Mo. 
1919) 217 SW 271, a State Auditor had refused to issue 
a w.arrant for the payment of the salary of an employee 
of the State Board of Equalization for which an appro-
priation had been made. Concerning the auditor's re-
fusal, the court stated: 
"It is plain, therefore, that under the law 
and the facts in this c.ase, it is the duty of respond-
ent to audit and allow relator's claim and to issue 
to him a warrant upon the State Treasury for the 
full amount thereof. Respondent has no discre-
tion in the matter. It is a plain ministerial duty." 
The cases reviewed by the Defendants are not factu-
ally in point and do not determine the issue here pre-
sented. 
The case of Reeves v. Talbot, 289 I\::y. 581, 159 SW 
2d 51, involving a request for out-of-state travel, dis-
cusses the relative authority of the Department of Fi-
nance .and the Com1nissioner of Revenue. Cases involv-
ing travel pay should be distinguised from disbursement 
of other appropriations. The situation here is similar 
to disbursement of funds to the state board members,di-
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rectly for their own expenses. The statutes specifically 
require that for travel expenses for members of the Board 
of Education, the Board of Exa1niners must approve the 
same. However, for other disburse1nents there is no such 
requirement. The directors of the junior colleges and 
the other colleges under the jurisdiction and control of 
the Board of Education enter into contracts authorizing 
disbursement of funds, etc., which action is independently 
ehecked and reviewed by the State Board of Education. 
However, for personal expenses or travel pay of the 
board members, there is no independent check unless, 
as the Legislature has provided, the Board of Examiners 
or some other agency is required to review those dis-
bursements. 
The holding in Reeves v. Talbot, supra, is similar 
to the holding in Marioneaux v. Cutler, supra, and State 
v. Edwards, supra, in that the court held in the Talbot 
case that the Department of Finance's refusal was-
"* * * based upon a misconstruction of the 
applicable law. The effect was to deprive the 
Commissioner of Revenue of a right which on a 
correct construction of the law would have been 
recognized." 
Therefore, the court's discussion as to the discretionary 
authority of the Department of Finance is only dicta. 
However, such discussion merely states that the Depart-
ment of Finance should approve-
"• • • the requisition if the purpose is within 
the scope of the appropriation for the department 
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and the amount is within the unexpended balance 
to the credit of the particular fund." 
At another place the court stated that the commis-
sioner could refuse the request if in his opinion-
"* * * the proposed travel is not legitimate 
or proper, considering the functions of the depart-
ment and the nature of the duties of the officer 
or employee and, as well, the purpose and char-
acter of the business to be attended to, or if he 
regards the proposed expenditure as prima facie 
excessive or if he ascertains it will exceed the 
balance of funds alloted to the department, he 
should disapprove the requisition in the manner 
prescribed by the statute." 
It is submitted that the court establishes the rule 
that the Department of Finance has the duty to examine 
the request to determine if there are sufficient funds 
appropriated to the department involved, that the request 
is for a public purpose within the scope of the authority 
of the particular department, and that the request does 
not violate any provision of the law. Such a holding 
is consistent with the contention of the Intervenor. 
The Kentucky court further stated that the request 
should be considered as "prima facie valid and proper." 
However, in the present case, the Defendants take the 
position that they have unlimited authority to approve 
or disapprove any request by the Respondent, which ac-
tion can only be challenged by showing an abuse of dis-
cretion on the part of the Defendants. The Kentucky 
case did not require the plaintiffs to show an abuse of 
discretion on the part of the Defendants. Rather, the 
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Department of Finance would have to show an abuse 
of discretion before it could deny the request. 
On May 18, 1953, the State Board of Education re-
quested approval from the State Board of Examiners 
for the State Superintendent to attend the annual meet-
ings of the National Council of Chief State School Offi-
cers and the National Education Association. The Board 
of Examiners were advised as follows: 
"Superintendent Bateman is Vice-President 
of the National Council of Chief State School Of-
ficers. He is chairman this year of the nominating 
committee, has been assigned to preside at one 
of the general meetings, and is to be .a speaker at 
another general meeting." 
The Board of Examiners were further advised that 
the expenses would be paid from the Public School Ad-
ministration Fund. On May 29, 1953, the Board of Ex-
aminers, by a letter, stated: 
"The board denied your request to incur out-
of-state travel expense for yourself to Miami 
Beach, Florida, June 24 to July 1." 
The case of Reeves v. Talbot cited by the Defendants 
would require the Board of Examiners to approve such 
a request for out-of-state travel. 
The case of State ex rel Yapp v. Chase, infra, cited 
by the Defendants deals with authority over employment 
of personnel and will be discussed under Point IV deal-
ing specifically with that problem. However, the case is 
of interest since it held that the Commission of Adminis-
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tration and Finance did not, in that c.ase, have any dis~ 
cretionary power. The court stated: 
"The conclusion follows that the existing law 
gave these employees a legal right to receive as 
compensation for their servicesthe amount &peci~ 
fied in the estimate, and there was no valid reason 
for refusing to approve such estimate. Its ap~ 
proval under such circumstances did not involve 
the exercise of any discretionary power." (Em~ 
phasis added) 
The Defendants rely on the case of State v. Manning, 
220 Iowa 525, 259 NW 213. It is asserted that the Court 
in that case sustained the discretionary power of a budget 
officer. The case was brought to remove a mayor and 
two city commissioners for transferring municipal funds 
from one account to another in violation of the specific 
provisions of the state law. The Defendants as a de~ 
fense challenge the constitutionality of the law. There 
is no showing that the budget officer was requested 
to approve the transfer or that any action of any type 
was taken by the budget officer. 
The decision of the Iowa court is of no value in de· 
termining whether the Board of Examiners or Commis-
sion of Finance in this case has either discretionary or 
ministerial authority. 
The defendants cite Sellers v. Frohmiller, 42 Ariz. 
239, 24 Pac. 2d 666 as a case similar to Reeves v. Talbot, 
supra, pertaining to a "provision of an appropriations 
act requiring the Governor's approval as to legality and 
necessity for proposed travel expenses." This case, like 
108 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
those heretofore reviewed and cited by the Defendants, 
is of no help in deciding the issue now presented to this 
court. In the first instance the claim was not proposed 
travel expenses, but rather was a claim for one day's 
salary. Secondly, the issue raised before the court was 
the constitutionality of an appropriations act. The court 
held that the act was unconstitutional since it involved 
not only appropriations, but also legislation regarding 
the disbursement of funds. 
If the case stood for the proposition as asserted 
by the Defendants, the holding would be inconsistent 
with the subsequent .Arizona case of Ward v. Frohmiller, 
supra. This was an action by employees against the state 
auditor to approve travel expenses for attending con-
ferences concerning governmental problems. The case 
is a clear holding that authority of a state officer to ad-
just and settle the amount of claims against the state 
payable out of the funds of the state is limited to the 
ministerial function of determining if the funds are being 
disbursed for a public purpose and within an appropri-
ation made by the Legislature. The court in so holding 
stated as follows: 
".After this is done, it must be presented to 
the auditor, and if it is, on its face, for a public 
purpose and is properly itemized and accompanied 
by vouchers, and an appropriation has been made 
by law for that purpose, it is the mandatory duty 
of the auditor to approve said claim and to issue 
a warrant therefor; no discretion being given, if 
the matters recited beforehand appear in the 
claim as presented." 
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The court summarized its holding as follows : 
"We hold, therefore, that if it appears from 
the face of the claims in the present case that they 
were in proper form and that the money claimed 
thereunder was expended for a public purpose, 
and they were properly approved by the head of 
th~ state department, it was the duty of the audi-
tor to approve the claims and issue the warrants.'' 
Another Arizona case, Industrial Commission v. 
Price, 37 Ariz. 245, 292 Pac. 1099, is cited by the De-
fendants. The case does not involve disbursement of 
funds or budgetary control, but rather deals with the 
authority of a statutory administrative agency to enter 
into employment contracts. This case will be reviewed 
under the next point specifically considering that issue. 
The Defendants cite the case of Wycoff v. W. H. 
Wheeler & Co., 38 Okla. 771, 135 Pac. 399, in answer to 
the Intervenor's assertion that the Board of Examiners 
and Commission of Finance have only ministerial duties 
with reference to disbursement of funds appropriated 
by the Legislature. This case once again is not factually 
in point. The case involved a suit by a publishing com-
pany to enjoin the defendants from entering into a new 
contract for the supplying of text books to the schools 
in the State of Oklahoma. The court stated that the 
issue was whether the Plaintiff had a valid contract to 
supply the text books. The law specifically provided that 
the Board of Education as the text-book commission could 
investigate and advertise for bids with reference to the 
books to be used, and that in entering into a contract the 
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publishing company had to present a written contract 
and bond for performance. The law provided that the 
bond should be approved by the Governor. The Governor 
refused to approve the bond. The court stated: 
"From all of which it appears that the state 
entrusted the business of making this contract to 
two of its agents, who were required to work to-
gether to that end-the Board and the Governor, 
and prescribed the duties of each; * * * The func-
tions each had to perform were intended to be 
of equal importance and indispensable to the 
other." 
Since the Governor had not approved the bond, the court 
held that the Plaintiff did not have a valid contract. 
It is not sufficient to answer the cases cited by the 
Intervenor by merely stating that they involved auditors 
and comptrollers. In those cases often the constitutional 
authority was much broader than the mere authority of 
''examining" claims as granted to the Board of Examin-
ers. 
In State ex rel W. R. Clark Printing & Binding Com-
pany, Inc., et al v. Lee, State Comptroller, supra, the 
court was construing the authority contained in Sec. 25, 
Article IV, Florida Constitution, which stated that the 
comptroller had power to examine, audit, adjust and set-
tle accounts of state officers." In fact, the most that 
can be said about the Board of Examiners is that as to 
the Board of Education it is a board of auditors. 
As was st~ated in Lewis v. Doran, supra: 
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"The relator, forever, contends that the word 
'examiner' means auditors; and that the powers 
instant to the name, being specifically conferred, 
are taken from the comptroller. Admit the propo-
sition as to the meaning of the word, yet the con-
clusion does not follow for the Board of Examin-
ers might be auditors, and still the comptroller 
be, as the name implies, chief auditor." 
As to the Board of Examiners, the Defendants rely, 
of course, primarily on the Idaho cases. As previously 
discussed, the Idaho cases are to be distinguished since 
the implementing legislation in Idaho considerably broad-
ened the authority of the Board of Examiners. Also, the 
Supreme Court sits as an appellate court of claims to 
review the action of the Board of Examiners for recom-
mendation to the Legislature. Also, there have been two 
amendments to the constitutional provision involved 
in the State of Idaho. In view of the constitutional, legis-
lative and case history, the Idaho cases must be distin-
guished. 
The Utah cases cited by Defendants concerning the 
authority of the Board of Examiners stand only for the 
proposition that if refusal to approve a claim is based on 
an issue of law the Board will be ordered to act or re-
frain from acting, depending on the determination of the 
legal question. The cases do not adjudicate the nature of 
the Board's authority. 
Only three Utah cases have involved the Board of 
Examiners as a party to the litigation. These cases con-
sidered the duty of the Board of Examiners in examining 
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claims which, as recognized by the Defendants, involved 
only questions of law. In Thoreson v. State Board of 
Examiners, supra, our Utah court stated: 
"It became and was a mandatory duty of the 
said board to receive, audit, and allow said claim, 
and that mandamus lies to enforce the perform-
ance of that ministerial duty." 
In State v. Cutler, supra, the court stated: 
"There is nothing upon which the Respond-
ents can legally exercise any discretionary powers 
in this case, and therefore, they should have audit-
ed and allowed the claim." 
The third cHse of Marioneaux v. Cutler, supra, 
did not discuss discretionary power, but rather 
considered the legality of the payment as raised 
by the decision of the Board of Examiners. None of 
these cases stands for a holding that the Board of Ex. 
aminers does have discretionary authority in a case such 
as is presented to the court. 
It is, of course, conceded that when the Board of 
Examiners is sitting as a court of claims for miscellan-
eous demands made upon the state and for the sifting 
of information and referring the same to the Legislature, 
that in such a case they would have discretionary au-
thority. But it is here maintained that a disbursement 
by the Board of Education is not a claim within the 
jurisdiction of the Board of Examiners, but if it is con-
cluded to be such a claim the authority of the Board of 
Examiners would be to determine if the disbursement is 
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authorized by an appropriation and is otherwise not il-
legal. 
In Utah the Department of Finance was created to 
pre-audit disbursements and the auditor, a constitutional 
officer, is required to post-audit disbursements. It can-
not be maintained that a statutory agency with pre-
auditing functions should have greater authority than 
the auditor. 
In State Board of Land Commissioners v. Ririe, 
56 Utah 213, 190 Pac. 59, the court stated: 
"However, it is no concern of the auditor, 
neither is it a part of his duty to ascertain whether 
the investment is desirable or whether the se-
curity is sufficient. Whenever the Land Board, or 
any committee or official whose duty it is to de-
termine those matters, has acted, such acts or con-
clusions are final and binding upon the auditor, 
so long as the investment is authorized by law. 
:ill • * 
"In the very nature of things in carrying on 
the affairs of the state, it could not be otherwise. 
If the auditor were charged with the duty and 
responsibility of examining and determining the 
legality and desirability of the investment of the 
funds of the state, then, indeed, would conflicts, 
disputes, and general chaos follow. The law has 
vested no such duty or authority in the auditor." 
If the authority of the Board of Examiners as a 
board of auditors over specific appropriations and the 
Department of Finance as a pre-auditing agency are not 
limited to the san1e 1ninisterial function as the auditor, as 
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was stated in the Ririe case, "conflicts, disputes and gen-
eral chaos" will follow, as is shown by the facts of this 
case. 
In the recent case of State Board of Education, et al 
v. Commission of Finance, supra, the Commission of 
Finance did not assert that it had discretionary 
authority. In refusing to approve the payment of salaries 
established by the State Board of Education, the Com-
mission of Finance contended that the State Board of 
Education was not legally constituted. They contended 
it did not have .authority to appoint the state superinten-
dent and fix his salary. The pleadings and the briefs 
set forth the statutes establishing the Department of 
Finance and its authority to approve disbursement of 
funds. No argument was made by the Department of 
Finance claiming a discretion to allow or disallow a claim. 
We must therefore conclude: 
1. The great weight of authority in other jurisdic-
tions where agencies are set up by the Constitution or by 
statute for the protecting of the funds of the State re-
gard the action of such agencies as ministerial and 
without discretion. 
2. The Utah law as decided particularly by the case 
of State v. Cutler, supra, is a direct holding that the 
Board of Examiners have no discretionary powers where 
a claim is specifically payable out of a defined appropri-
ation. The most that Defendants can argue is that so far 
as the Board of Education is concerned the Board of 
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Examiners have a ministerial responsibility to examine 
the claims. 
3. The Utah law as decided in the case of State 
Board of Land Commissioners v. Ririe, supra, holds that 
the Auditor, a constitutional officer, has only a minister-
ial duty over the expenditures of other .agencies. The 
Department of Finance, a statutory auditing agency, can 
have no greater authority. 
4. The cases cited by the Defendants do not con-
sider the issues as here presented, and are not factually 
in point. Certainly the Commission of Finance has only 
a ministerial duty with reference to disbursements by 
the State Board of Education. 
5. If disbursements by the Respondents are con-
sidered to be claims which must be presented to the Board 
of Examiners, the authority of the Board should be 
limited to "Examination" of those disbursements within 
the limitations herein discussed. 
POINT IV 
IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL THE DE-
PARTMENT OF FINANCE HAS NO AUTHORITY OVER 
THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
We have heretofore discussed the factual situation 
concerning the employment of personnel by the State 
Board of Education and control and supervision exer-
cised by the Department of Finance and the Board of 
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Examiners. (Point I) The discussion of the law under 
that point was limited to the determination of whether 
the Board of Examiners had any authority over such 
matters. The issue here presented relates to the ap-
parent conflict in statutory authority of the Board of 
Education and the Department of Finance. 
The trial court found: "The Board of Examiners and 
the Finance Commission do not have authority over the 
employment of experts or specially qualified personnel 
by the Board of Education." (R. 73) The Appellant in 
challenging the determination by the trial court merely 
cites the statute and states that it speaks for itself. 
Reference is then made to cases considered under a pre-
ceding point. Such an approach to the problem ignores 
specific statutory authority granted to the Board of Edu-
cation. It also ignores the legislative history and the 
nature of the enactments. The authority of the Board 
of Education is subsequent to the authority of the Com-
mission of Finance. The authority of the Board of Ed-
ucation is specific, while the authority of the Commission 
of Finance is general. The two cases dealing with the 
specific problem of the employment of personnel dis-
cussed in the preceding point referred to by the Defend-
ants do not stand for the proposition for which they are 
cited and can be readily distinguished. 
The Board of Education, in addition to having the 
constitutional and statutory authority of general super-
vision and control of the public school system, is author-
ized by Section 53-2-8, U.C.A., 1953, as follows: 
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"The Board may appoint such .assistant su-
perintendents, directors, supervisors, assistants, 
clerical workers, and other employees, as in the 
judgment of the Board may be necessary to the 
proper administration and supervision of the 
public school system. The salaries of such assist-
ant superintendents, directors, supervisors, assist-
ants, clerical workers, and other employees shall 
be fixed by the Board and shall be paid from 
money appropriated for that purpose." 
The law as it above reads was enacted by Chapter 
16, Section 3, Laws of Utah 1951, Fiist Special Session. 
Section 5 of the foregoing Chapter 16, Laws of Utah 
1951, First Special Session, provided : 
"All existing statutes of the State of Utah 
which are inconsistent or in conflict with this act, 
are to the extent of such inconsistency or con-
flict, declared null and void insofar as they relate 
to the provisions of this act." 
Section 53-2-8 was amended by Chapter 80, Section 
1 ,Laws of Utah 1953; however, the above provisions were 
not changed. 
The foregoing statutory provisions clearly specify 
that the Board of Education shall have authority to em-· 
ploy its personnel and to determine the salary which shall 
be paid to them. However, the Departn1ent of Finance 
maintains that it has authority over such matters by 
virtue of Sections 63-2-13 and 63-2-14, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, for1nerly Sections 82C-2-13 and 82C-2-14, 
which provide as follows: 
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63-2-13. "The commissiOn of finance shall 
prescribe and fix a schedule of salaries for the 
officers, clerks, stenographers and employees of 
state offices, departments, boards and commis-
sions, except where such s.alaries are fixed by 
statute or by appropriation; and such schedule of 
salaries shall have the force of law in all state 
offices, departments, boards and commissions, and 
shall in no case be exceeded without the express 
approval of the commission of finance. 
63-2-14. "The commission of finance shall ex-
amine all requests for personnel and shall approve 
or disapprove the same and no new position shall 
be created and no vacancy shall be filled until 
the commission has certified to the department 
requesting the creation of a new position or the 
filling of the vacancy that the position is neces-
sary to carry on the work of such department in 
an efficient and business-like manner and that the 
necessary funds therefor are available to the de-
partment. The commission shall investigate the 
need for every existing position in every depart-
ment and shall report its findings to the board of 
examiners with its recommendations for the most 
effective me.ans of discontinuing unnecessary 
positions." 
The foregoing sections were enacted in 1941 and have not 
been amended since that time. The specific authority of 
the Board of Education is granted subsequent to the 
general authority of the Commission of Finance. 
The following brief quotations accurately state a 
fundamental rule of construction which has been ignored 
by the Defendants : 
March v. Aljoe, 41 Wyo. 119, 282 Pac. 1055: 
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"It is a familiar and elementary rule of 
statutory construction that if it is not possible to 
reconcile inconsistent statutes, the dates of their 
enactment will be consulted in determining the 
legislative meaning and effect given to the later 
one. See United States v. Tynen, 78 U.S. (11 
Wall.) 92, 20 L. Ed. 153 ; Sedgwick on Statutory 
Construction, 125; State ex rel. Attorney General 
v. Heidorn, 7 4 Mo. 410; Bramham v. City of Dur-
ham, 171 N.C. 196, 88 SE 347; in re Ogilvie's Es-
tate, 291 Pa. 326, 139 A. 826; State v. Anderson, 
191 Wis. 538, 211 NW 938." 
State v. Langer, 177 NW 408, 46 N.D. 462: 
"It is a well-settled rule of law, where two 
legislative acts are reJ!ugnant to or in conflict with 
each other, that the latest expression of the legis-
lative will must control, even though it contains 
no repealing clause. 36 Cyc.1073." 
The Legislature could not, even if it so intended, 
constitutionally grant to the Department of Finance 
power and authority by virtue of controlling the em-
ployment of personnel the right to interfere with the 
functions of the State Board of Education. However, 
in this case the Legislature has not so intended, rather 
it has by statute granted to the Board of Education com-
plete control and supervision over the employment of its 
personnel. By the terms of the law amending and re-
enacting these provisions, all prior laws inconsistent 
or in conflict therewith were declared null and void inso-
far as they related to the authority of the Board of 
Education. The statutory authority of the Commission 
of Finance as construed by the Defendants would there-
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fore be null and void. In addition, the specific authority 
of the Board of Education would control over the gen-
eral authority of the Department of Finance. 
The courts construing similar authority have uni-
formly held that it was the intention of the Legislature 
to grant complete control over employment to the agency 
involved. 
In State v. Miser, 72 Pac. 2nd 408, 30 Ariz. 244, the 
court held that such a statute, conferring authority 
over employment of personnel upon the Board of Re-
gents of the University of Arizona, gave to that Board 
complete control in the management of its affairs plac-
ing wholly within its hands the power to say who shall 
enter the service of the University, from president to 
janitor, and to decide what salary shall be paid. The Ari-
zona law stated: 
"Sec. 1135. Powers of board; appointment 
of professors; salaries; tuition. The board shall 
enact ordinances for the government of the uni-
versity; appoint and employ a president of the 
university, and professors, instructors, lecturers, 
and other officers and employees, and fix and 
determine the salaries of the persons so appointed 
and employed; remove any officer or employee 
when in its judgment the interests of the uni-
versity require; fix all fees to be charged by the 
university and graduate the same as between resi-
dents, non-residents and students from foreign 
countries." 
The court on construing this law stated: 
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"It is clear from these and other sections per-
taining to the university that the Board of Re-
gents is given complete control in the management 
of its affairs, including the expenditure of its 
funds, and that the only restriction placed upon 
it in paying these out is that they must be used 
for the purpose for which they were appropriated. 
Section 1135, it will be noted, makes it the duty 
of the Board of Regents to 'appoint and employ 
a president of the university, and professors, in-
structors, lecturers, and other officers and em-
ployees, and fix and determine the salaries of per-
sons so appointed and employed,' thus•placing 
wholly within its hands the power to say who shall 
enter the service of the university, from president 
to janitor, and to decide how much salary he shall 
receive." (emphasis added) 
Although the Utah legislature intended to grant 
authority to the State Board of Education to employ 
state directors down to janitors, it will be remembered 
that the Utah State Board of Education has not been 
permitted to employ and determine the salary of state 
directors or to even employ janitors on a ten1porary basis. 
Assuming that the statutory authority of both de-
partments was of equal dignity as to time, the statutes 
would have to be construed so as to make the Board of 
Education dominant in its field. 
As was held in State v. Herrick, 140 NE 31±, 107 Oh. 
St. 611, although the Department of Finance is import-
ant, its importance is not such as to overshadow all the 
other departments and con1pletely reduce them to a state 
of i1npotence. A reasonable construction of the relative 
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authority of the two departments must be made if the 
finance commission law is to be held constitutional. 
In the case of State v. Herrick, supra, the contracting 
authority of the Director of Highways in relationship 
to the authority of the Department of Finance was dis-
cussed. The contemplated contract, however, was not 
for the employment of personnel. The Ohio statutory 
authority of the Department of Highways was as follows: 
"Sec. 154-40. The department of highways 
and public works shall have all powers and per-
form .all duties vested by law in the superintendent 
of public works, the state highway commissioner, 
the chief highway engineer, and the state build-
ing commission. * * *" 
The statutory authority of the Department of Fi-
nance was as follows : 
" (Sec. 154-28) The department of finance 
shall have power to exercise control over the fi-
nancial transactions of all departments, offices 
and institutions, excepting the judicial and legis-
lative departments, as follows: * * * 
"(3) By requiring itemized statements of 
expenditures proposed for any specified future 
period to be submitted to the department, and 
by approving or disapproving all or any p,art of 
such proposed expenditures. · 
" ( 4) By requiring orders, invoices, claims, 
vouchers or payrolls to be submitted to the de-
partment, where such submission is prescribed 
by law or where the Governor shall deem such 
submission necessary, and by approving or dis-
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approving such orders, invoices, claims, vouchers, 
payrolls. * * *" 
In this action the Director of Finance refused to 
approve a contract recommended by the Director of 
Highways for the reason that the said Director of Fi-
nance did "not regard it as an appropriate or desirable 
contract for the state to enter into." The issue before 
the court was stated as follows : 
"This question is purely one of statutory 
construction. The inquiry is as to the power and 
authority of each of the aforesaid departments of 
the administrative branch of the government, as 
to what extent each is dependent upon the other, 
and to what extent, if at all, the finance depart-
ment is authorized to control the policy of the 
highway department in the matter of state aid in 
the construction of highways throughout the state. 
* * * 
"Each of the branches has certain duties to 
discharge, and the head of each department is 
burdened with certain responsibilities. The duties 
of each relate to separate and distinct functions, 
each requiring certain technical skill, knowledge, 
experience, and training not common to all the 
others." 
The court further made the distinction that the De-
partment of Highways and Public Works was not a con-
stitutional office, but nevertheless concluded that the 
Commissioner of Finance did not have authority to su-
pervise the policies of a highway department. 
"It is true that the departmet of finance is 
first named, and it may be conceded that none of 
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the other departments ranks greater in import-
ance, yet it does not follow that its importance 
is such as to overshadow all the others and to 
completely reduce them to a state of impotence. 
If any illustration is necessary to show that such 
power and authority in the director of finance 
as claimed in this case, if applied to all the other 
administrative branches of the state government, 
would completely submerge the other branches 
and put it within the power of the director of fi-
nance to completely defeat and destroy the use-
fulness of the other branches, that illustration is 
found in the facts of the present controversy. 
"We shall not attempt in this proceeding to 
define the duties and limitations of the director 
of finance in his relations to the directors of 
the other departments, but we do find it neces-
sary and do not hesitate to say that his duties 
do not reach even in the remotest degree to a con-
trol of the policies of the department of highways 
and public works. 
"While the Administrative Code has not at-
tempted to define the technical qualifications of 
the director of finance, it will be readily conceded 
that the duties devolved upon him by that Code 
require the training of a banker and an account-
ant. The Legislature has, however, clearly rec-
ognized the fact that the technical qualifications 
of the state highway engineer, one of the offices 
created in the department of highways and public 
works, shall be those of a competent civil engin-
eer, with at least five years' experience in the 
construction and maintenance of highways. It 
would be a little short of absurdity to require this 
skilled knowledge, training and experience in the 
highway department, if the policy of the highway 
125 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
department were entirely subject to the control 
of the finance department." 
Proper administration of the affairs of the State 
Department of Education require skill, training, experi. 
ence and study expected of those delegated the authority 
of conducting those affairs. The members of the De. 
partment of Finance cannot be expected to have those 
qualifications, but rather, as stated in the preceding 
case, they are selected having in mind quite different 
qualifications for the performance of quite different 
functions. Both departments by a proper construction 
of their statutory authority can be supreme in their own 
sphere of activity and as such serve a valuable function 
and perform a valuable service without interfering with 
the performance of the duties of other agencies. 
As was stated in State v. Cunningham, 101 Pac. 962, 
39 Mont. 163, the power to control the employment of 
personnel gives the power to control the agency involved. 
By Section 262, Revised Codes of Montana, the Board 
of Examiners was given authority over en1ployment of 
personnel similar to the authority granted to the Depart-
ment of Finance. The Montana law stated: 
"The board of examiners may at any time, 
when necessary, employ clerical help for any state 
officer or board, and no clerks must be en1ployed 
by such officers or board without the authority 
of the board of examiners, and no such clerks 
must be employed by the board of examiners 
except when all duties of the office cannot be 
performed by the officer himself." 
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Pursuant to this statutory authority the Board of 
Examiners of Montana attempted to determine the com-
pensation to be paid to an employee of the Supreme 
Court. Concerning the exercise of this authority the 
court stated : 
"The result of this action, if it be held to be a 
binding force, is that this court in some of its 
important functions is subject to the control of 
the state board of examiners; for to say that it 
may grant the court permission to employ a steno-
grapher is to say that in its discretion it may 
withhhold permission. This means no more or less 
than that, though the services of a stenographer 
are absolutely necessary to the proper accomplish-
ment of the work of the court-a fact about which 
there can be no dispute-the board may in its 
discretion cut off all such services, and thus vir-
tually disable the court, or at least seriously im-
pede and hamper it, in the discharge of its duties. 
To say that it may fix the compensation to be paid 
for such services is also an assertion of the same 
power; for, if through mistake or lack of knowl-
edge, or from any other cause, if any such exist, 
the board should fix the compensation at such a 
figure as to render it impossible to secure suitable 
service, this would be attended by the same conse-
quence as if no compensation were allowed. * * • 
"In view of these considerations, it is mani-
fest that the power to select the proper employee 
could not with propriety be vested elsewhere than 
in the court itself; and it is equally manifest that 
the power to say whether it may or may not be 
necessary to have assistance, and what the qualifi-
cations of the assistant shall be, may not be vested 
elsewhere. If the power of appointment exists at 
all, it is a necessary power of the court, and, 
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since the qualifications of the individual desired 
is determined in a measure by the amount of com-
pensation paid for his services, the power to fix 
the compensation is also a necessary power. In 
short, the court has the inherent power to select 
and appoint its own necessary assistants and 
make the compensation due for their services a 
charge against the state as a liquidated claim. 
Any other conclusion would be to put t·he court 
in the attitude of a petitioner to the board of ex-
aminers from time to time, and thus reduce it 
from the position as a coordinate branch of the 
government to the level of the ordinary citizen 
who desires or claims payment for services ren-
dered. * * *" (Emphasis added) 
The Board of Education being a constitutional body 
directed by the Constitution to perform functions like-
wise has the inherent power to select and appoint its 
own necessary assistants and the power to fix the com 
pensation paid to such assistants. Any construction of 
any stautory law repugnant to this authority would ren-
der such statute unconstitutional. 
Although the statutory law was the same at the time 
the recent Utah c.ase of State Board of Education, et al. 
v. Commission of Finance, supra, was decided,the Depart-
ment of :B-,inance did not feel that the argument her~ 
presented had sufficient Inerit to urge the same upon 
the Supreme Court, although the issue was raised by the 
Board of Education. 
The two cases dealing with the en1ployment of per-
sonnel cited by the Defendants do not support the hold-
ings for which they are cited. 
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State ex rel Y app v. Chase, 165 :Minn. 268, 206 NW 
396, cited by Defendants, involved a suit brought by the 
Railroad and Industrial Commission and five of its em-
ployees against the Commission of .Administration and 
Finance and the state auditor for payment of salaries 
determined by the Railroad and Industrial Commission. 
The lower court granted a preemptory writ ordering the 
Defendants to pay the salary claims. On appeal the de-
cision of the lower court was affirmed, and in so doing 
the Supreme Court stated as follows : 
"If the approval of the estimate for the sala-
ries in controversy involved the exercise of discre-
tionary powers on the part of the Commission of 
.Administration and Finance, its action cannot be 
reviewed or controlled by the courts. But if these 
salaries had been lawfully fixed and the existing 
law gave the en1ployees named the legal right to 
the amount specified in the estimate, the approval 
of the estimate did not involve the exercise of any 
discretionary power on the part of that Commis-
sion, and the refusal to approve it was an arbi-
trary act against which the courts may properly 
grant relief." 
The holding of the court in the above-mentioned Min-
nesota case supports the contention of the Intervenor 
rather than the position of the Defendants on the issu8 
here discussed. The court stated: 
"The conclusion follows that the existing law 
gave these employees a legal right to receive as 
compensation for their services the amount speci-
fied in the estimate, and there was no valid reason 
for refusing to approve such estimate. Its ap-
proval under s·uch circumstances did not involve 
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the exercise of any discretionary power." (Em. 
phasis added) 
As previously stated, the preemptory writ granted 
by the trial court was sustained ordering the Commission 
of Administration and Finance and auditor to pay thP. 
salaries of the employees involved. 
The Defendants cited the case of Industrial Commis-
sion v. Price, supra, under the preceding point. The In-
dustrial Commission of Arizona was established to ad-
minister the workmen's compensation law. The specific 
statute establishing and defining the authority of the 
Industrial Commission stated: 
"Such employment and fair compensation 
shall be first approved by the governor." 
it must be recognized that there is a fundamental distinc-
tion between statutory .agencies and constitutional agen-
cies. The legislature in establishing a law for work-
men's compensation benefits could if it so desired require 
the Governor to administer the provisions of that statute, 
or could appoint an agency subject to the approval of 
the Governor to administer the law, or might even es-
tablish an agency without the Governor's .approval to ad~ 
minister the provisions of the act. The Legislature havd 
ing the authority to create the agency in the first instance 
may define and limit the authority of such agency as it 
may desire. A different situation is involved when a 
constitution creates .a ~tate board of education, defining 
its duties consistent with other constitutional provisions 
requiring the state to provide for the education of its 
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inhabitants. In this latter situation the legislature cannot 
specify limitations which will frustrate and circumvent 
the provisions of the constitution. 
The facts before the Arizona court in the foregoing 
case were substantially different than those here pre-
sented. In the first instance the specific statute referring 
to the Industrial Commission required the governor's 
approval. In this case the specific statute pertaining to 
the Board of Education states that the. Board may ap-
point its various employees and has eliminated therefrom 
the previous requirement that such employment be ap-
proved by the Board of Examiners or any other officer. 
The specific statutory authority of the Board of Educa-
tion is subsequent to the general enactment giving to the 
statutory Department of Finance authority over employ-
ment of personnel. 
The later case of State v. Miser, supra, is more in 
point. 
The cases cited by the Defendants are not in point, 
to show that in the employment of personnel the Depart-
ment of Finance has authority over the State Board of 
Education, and therefore we must conclude: 
1. Statutes appearing to be in conflict should be 
construed in favor of granting to each department au-
thority to operate without interference in its own sphere 
of activity. 
2. Specific statutory authority of the Board of 
Education refers to the employment of personnel by the 
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Board of Education in particular, while the authority 
of the Department of Finance is only general. 
3. The recent statutory authority of the Board 
of Education pertaining to employment of personnel su. 
perseded the statutory authority of the Department of 
Finance. 
4. If the Department of Finance has authority to 
control employment of the Board of Education personnel 
and their salaries, it has in effect the power to control 
the Bo.ard of Education, rendering such law unconstitu-
tional. 
5. In the employment of personnel the Department 
of Finance has no authority over the State Board of 
Education. 
POINT V 
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION MAY EMPLOY INDE· 
PENDENT LEGAL ~COUNSEL WHEN THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL IS REPRESENTING OTHER STATE AGENCIES 
ASSERTING RIGHTS IN CONFLICT WITH THE AUTHOR-
ITY OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
The Board of Education admits that it is a board 
or commission of the State of Utah as referred to in 
Section 67-5-1 (1), U.C.A. 1953, and th.at in ordinary 
matters it looks and should look to the Attorney Gen-
eral for the prosecution or defense of the causes in which 
it is interested. But where the Attorney General (1} 
refuses to represent the Board of Education, or (2} 
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, recommends that the Board of Education employ other 
counsel, or (3) represents other departments asserting 
authority in conflict with that of the Board of Education, 
or ( 4) where the Attorney General is actually an adverse 
party, then the Board is acting reasonably and of neces-
sity in employing private counsel. It would be unreason-
able under such circumstances to hold that the Board of 
Education could not employ independent legal counsel 
and that the Board could not do so without first securing 
permission from the Attorney General. As was stated in 
State v. Cunningham, supra, to say that one may grant 
permission is to say that one in his discretion may with-
hold permission. 
Page 99 of the Exhibit shows that in the lawsuit com-
menced by a taxpayer against the Board of Education 
in which the Board of Education thought it important 
to challenge the availability of an appropriation for a 
research fund and also to challenge the authority of the 
Finance Commission to fix salaries of professional per-
sonnel the Attorney General recommended that the Board 
select its own counsel. Thereafter A. M. Ferro, attorney 
at law, was employed by the Board of Education and 
performed services in the matter of the research fund 
during the months of October, November and December, 
1950, and January, 1951, and rendered a statement for 
such services. (Exhibit 2, Page 101) 
The submission of this bill by the Board of Educa-
tion and its efforts to get the Attorney General to rule 
on the legality of the claim are shown at pages 100, 102 
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and 103 of Exhibit 2. Such an opinion was never given 
and the claim was not approved by the Finance Commis-
sion. It was therefore presented to the Board of Exam-
iners who failed to approve it and transmitted it to the 
Legislature without recommendation. (Exhibit 2, Page 
104). After appropriation of the funds by the Legisla-
ture, the Governor vetoed the bill which would have paid 
the claim. (Exhibit 2, Page 105) 
The facts with reference to employment of counsel 
in this case are similar. In answer to allegations in 
Intervenor's Complaint that the Board of Education 
should be allowed to employ its own counsel, the Attor-
ney General stated: 
"Whenever a dispute arises between Defend-
ant, the Attorney General, and any other officer 
of the state, including the Intervenor, the Attor-
ney General, upon request offers to and does ap-
point attorneys chosen or approved by the other 
state officer or agency, including the Intervenor, 
as Special Assistant Attorneys General to repre-
sent said other state officer or agency whose 
claims are adverse to the counsel, legal advice or 
claims of the Attorney General." (Ans. to Count 
V, Par. 4) 
The former Attorney General, in an opinion which 
was published in his biennial report June 30, 1952, com-
mencing at Page 213, stated: "Obviously, it would be 
improper for this office to attempt to represent both 
sides of the controversy." 
The cases clearly hold that where there is a conflict 
of interest or where the Attorney General is in fact an 
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adverse party, independent counsel may be employed 
and the law decided in those cases does not impose any 
restrictions on the exercise of that right. 
In State v. Langer, supra, the court held that the 
law did not require the futile action of securing the per-
mission of the Attorney General by another state officer 
when the action was against the Attorney General as a 
party. The respondents objected to the jurisdiction of 
the court upon the ground that no application was made 
to the Attorney General to institute the proceedings. 
In answer to this contention the court stated as follows: 
"This technical objection is also without 
merit. It is true that ordinarily the consent or re-
fusal of the Attorney General should be secured 
in initiating the exercise of the original jurisdic-
tion of this court for the reason that ordinarily 
the Attorney General is the legal representative 
of the interests of the state, its sovereignty, fran-
chises, and liberties of the people. However, the 
contention is absurd that an application should 
be made to that officer in an action in which he 
is in fact one of the parties defendant, and which 
concerns his alleged wrongful acts and seeks to 
restrain them. The law does not require futile 
acts. The original jurisdiction of this court is 
not to be denied merely because the Attorney Gen-
eral happens to be one of the respondents." 
The law, concerning situations where the Attorney 
General is presented with a conflict of interest is re-
ported in 7 C.J.S. 1229, Attorney General, Section 8b, 
as follows: 
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"Conflicting interests 
"Between conflicting duties and interests the 
attorney general should choose that duty or inter-
est most closely identified with the public good. 
* * *" 
"Where an application to prohibit wrongful 
acts would ordinarily be made by the attorney 
general, but he is .alleged to be the wrongdoer, the 
court may entertain the petition of parties inter-
ested without the consent of such attorney gen-
eral." 
The cases support the foregoing statement of the law. 
In JJfarsh v. Aljoe, supra, the court had to construe 
the effect of two inconsistent statutes. By one statute 
the Attorney General was directed to represent claim-
ants under the workmen's compensation statute. Under 
another provision it provided: 
"The Attorney General, or his deputy or as-
sistant shall act as the attorney of the state treas-
urer in all cases." 
The lawsuit involved an assertion by a claimant for 
workmen's compensation which position was contested by 
the state treasurer. The court in holding that the Attor-
ney General owed a paramount duty to the state treas-
urer and could not represent both sides of the contro-
versy stated : 
"It is plain, we think, that when, under the 
statutes as they now stand, the duty owed by the 
Attorney General and his assistants to the claim-
ant, under section 4328, supra, to conduct the 
proceedings in this court in the latter's behalf, 
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conflicts with that owed the treasurer of the state 
of Wyoming in such proceedings, the duty first 
mentioned must yield and the right of the treas-
urer to the services of the Attorney General is 
paramount. In the instant case the claimant is 
represented by counsel, unconnected with the At-
torey General's Office, and his interests are there-
fore fully protected. Other reasons exist which 
lead to the same result on this point, but we do not 
deem it necessary to extend this opinion further." 
In State v. Exectttive Council of State, 223 NW 737, 
207 Iowa 923, the court stated as follows: 
"The legislative call upon the Attorney Gen-
eral to test ·the constitutionality of the act, by 
action brought by himself, overlooked the limita-
tions upon the power of the judiciary, and quite 
ignored the legitimate scope of the powers of the 
Attorney General. By the very nature of his 
office, and by statute, he is the legal advisor, both 
of the executive council .and of the General As-
sembly. To require him to maintain this action 
is to put him in a position which is repugnant to 
his other official duties." 
State ex rel Dysart v. Gage, 107 Wash. 282, 181 Pac. 
855, was cited in a quotation from the Dunbar case in 
the Attorney General's 1951 opinion. Here the directors 
of a school district attempted to consolidate school dis-
tricts upon advice of the prosecuting attorney for the 
county, a statutory officer who: 
"Shall have authority and it shall be his duty 
• * • to appear for and represent the state and 
the county and all school districts in the county in 
which he is a prosecuting attorney * '"' • ." 
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Entanglements arose between the districts where-
upon the prosecuting attorney advised the directors to 
employ the relators who were private attorneys. The 
services were satisfactory and this action was brought 
by the attorneys against the auditor to compel payment. 
The court examined the statute creating the school dis-
tricts, which had broad powers including the power to 
sue and be sued, and held that these powers : 
"Must include the right to employ special 
counsel when, as here, the prosecuting attorney 
cannot act and the necessity for legal aid is ur-
gent. The statute heretofore referred to regard-
ing the prosecuting attorney is merely a definition 
of their powers, and does not attempt to restrain, 
modify, or define the powers of boards of school 
directors." 
The court then noted that the attorney had advised 
hiring relators (as in Ferro's case) : 
"And it is apparent that the proper attention 
to the affairs of the district demanded that coun-
sel be procured to represent it, and the prosecut-
ing attorney, being the adviser of all the school 
districts, could not, in the nature of things, prop-
erly represent the interests of this district, when 
they had become antagonistic to interests of the 
other districts with which a consolidation had 
been attempted. An urgent necessity existed for 
procuring special assistance, and it was only in 
meeting this necessity and upon the advice of the 
prosecuting attorney that the relators were em-
ployed." 
And the auditor was ordered to pay the claim. 
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r: 
The Attorney General's 1951 opinion, after consider-
ing the Dunbar and Reiter cases in Washington said: 
"Under the authority of these cases the Fi-
nance Commission should be permitted to employ 
counsel to defend it in the action which will be 
brought on behalf of the Board of Education and 
the superintendent to compel payment of the 
salary in question." 
It surely cannot be argued that the Finance Commis-
sion would have authority to employ counsel whereas 
the Board of Education would not, the Attorney General 
representing the opposite party in each case. 
In State v. Hendrix, 124 Pac. 2nd 769, Arizona 
(1942) the court stated that "the Attorney General can-
not properly represent" two public officers involving 
conflicting claims. 
The statutory law pertaining to the authority of 
the Attorney General in Arizona is practically identical 
with the law of Utah with the exception that the Utah 
law does not provide that no commission or agency, etc., 
shall employ any other attorney. 
The court stated: 
" ( 13-15) It not infrequently happens that 
one public officer may take a certain view of the 
law, while another may construe it in a contrary 
manner, and litigation may properly be com-
menced to determine the true construction. The 
attorney general obviously cannot properly repre-
sent both officers. He must choose whioh, side he 
will take. If the other officer is not permitted to 
secure competent counsel to represent his point 
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of view, it may be that the court will be misled 
into rendering a wrong judgment. Further, since 
the attorney general has no discretion to deter-
mine whether suits like the present one be com-
menced or maintained by the auditor, it would 
be unreasonable to hold that section 4-503 supra, 
was intended by the legislature to deny the offi-
cer, whose discretion it was to determine whether 
the suit should be instituted and maintained, the 
right to be represented by counsel whom she 
thought could and would present her view of the 
law, in a manner satisfactory to her, to the court. 
***" 
In the present case we know of no Utah law specifi-
cally prohibiting the Board of Education from employing 
independent counsel. And, unlike the Arizona action, 
this case presents a conflict of interest with reference to 
representation by the Attorney General. 
It was stated in the Attorney General's opinion as 
well as in the cases that it was "obvious that the Attor-
ney General could not represent both sides of the dis-
pute." It cannot be disputed that it is unethical for attor-
neys to represent both sides of a controversy or clients 
having conflicting interests. Since different members 
of a law firm cannot represent both sides of a contro-
versy it should likewise follow that different members 
of the Attorney General's staff should not be permitted 
to litigate both sides of a dispute As was stated in 
Gillam v. Sanders,204 N.C. 206, 209, 167 SE 799, 800: 
"The unamendable mandate of both law and 
morals forbids an attorney, in the homely phrase 
of the field, 'to run with the rabbits and bark with 
the hounds.' " 
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The Utah court in the case of Chez, Attorney Gen-
eral, ex rel Weber College v. State Building Board, 93 
Utah 538, 74 Pac. 2d 687, recognized the impropriety of 
the attorney general's staff representing both sides of a 
lawsuit. In a concurring opinion the court stated: 
"The matter comes before us distinctly as a 
'case made,' a 'friendly suit,' to obtain a certain 
judicial determination, without a basic or real 
dispute between the parties, as is evidenced by 
the fact that the attorney general brings the ac-
tion, and some members of his office staff appear 
for plaintiffs, while others appear for defendants. 
This method of presenting questions for judicial 
determination is not to be commended or en-
couraged. It is hardly fair to the court, nor to 
the parties involved." 
The Defendants do not seriously contend that inde-
pendent legal counsel may not be employed when there 
is a conflict between two state agencies. The point of dif-
ference appears to be in the procedure to be followed 
before legal counsel is selected. It is the contention of the 
Defendants that permission from the attorney general 
should first be secured. 
The procedure suggested by the Defendants is that 
if the department is not satisfied with the opinion of the 
attorney general a request should be made for recon-
sideration of that opinion. If this is unavailing the at-
torney general should be requested to take legal action. 
At this point the attorney general then will decide upon 
which side of the controversy he will align himself, and 
if there is substantial merit to the other side to warrant 
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approval of opposing counsel. Applying this procedure 
to the factual situation presented by the Board of Edu-
cation, it shows that the requirement merely calls for 
futile action. 
When the Board of Examiners refuses requests for 
disbursements of funds the Board of Education should 
request the attorney general to again reconsider opin-
ions as to the authority of the Board of Examiners. It 
is not seriously believed that the attorney general would 
reverse these prior opinions. Then, according to the 
Defendants, requests should be made upon the attorney 
general to bring action on behalf of the Board of Educa-
tion against the Board of Examiners. Again this action 
would seem to be futile and unnecessary since it is con-
ceded by the Defendants that the attorney general cannot 
represent both sides and to assume that the Attorney 
General would choose to represent the Board of Educa-
tion involving a suit challenging prior opinions of the 
attorney general and the authority of a board upon which 
the attorney general is a member is completely unreason-
able and illogical. Even at this point, however, according 
to the Defendants, the Board of Education would not be 
permitted to employ legal counsel, but rather they must 
now request the attorney general to determine if the 
proposed case challenging the opinions of the attorney 
general and the action of the board of which he is a 
member has any merit. Of course the attorney general 
would be reluctant to see such a suit commenced, and 
further, to have the expense of employing special coun-
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l' ,. 
sel charged against his department. The entire suggested 
procedure is completely futile and illogical. 
In the pleadings of this case and by official opinion 
the Attorney General recognizes the impropriety of his 
office representing both sides of a dispute. Yet the At-
torney General insists that his permission must be se-
cured before the agency not represented by his office can 
employ independent counsel. In an attempt to comply 
with this requirement request was made to the Attorney 
General for permission to employ counsel to instigate 
an original action in the Supreme Court challenging the 
authority of the Board of Examiners to reduce the salary 
of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. (Ex-
hibit 2, Page 107) Even though the Attorney General 
does not feel qualified to represent the Board of Educa-
tion in such matters, he apparently feels that he is quali-
fied in spite of his conflict in interest to decide whether 
or not suit should be commenced which would involve 
him as a party challenging the authority of the action 
of a board of which he is a member. 
There is an additional reason why the Board of Edu-
cation should be permitted to employ independent legal 
counsel without securing the permission of the Attorney 
General or having such counsel appointed as an assistant 
attorney general. The Attorney General is appropriated 
funds with which to carry on the normal operations of 
his office. To require him to appoint special counsel to 
litigate issues in which the Board of Education is pri-
marily interested is to require him to pay out of his 
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budget the expenses so involved. Naturally, under such 
circumstances ,he would be reluctant to incur this addi-
tional expense. It is more logical to require the Board 
of Education to incur this expense since they are most 
directly affected. 
By the pleadings the Attorney General claims to be 
the exclusive counsel for all state agencies and depart-
ments. Yet in the Ferro case the Attorney General de-
clined to represent the intervenors and suggested that 
independent counsel be employed. Thereafter the Attor-
ney General failed to give an opinion authorizing pay-
ment, the Board of Examiners failed to approve pay-
ment, and after the Legislature appropriated funds for 
payment the Governor vetoed the same. This is just one 
more example of the subjugation of the Board of Educa-
tion by the Attorney General, Board of Examiners, and 
the Governor. 
By refusing to represent the Board of Education, 
by failing to approve payment for independent legal 
counsel, by failing to appoint independent legal counsel, 
by vetoing appropriations made for payment, the Attor-
ney General, the Board of Examiners and the Governor 
continue to completely control and subordinate the Board 
of Education even to the extent of attempting to pro-
hibit and thwart the Board's right and duty to secure 
judicial interpretation of its constitutional authority. 
When the Attorney General (1) refuses to represent 
the Board of Education or (2) recommends that the 
Board of Education employ other counsel, or (3) repre-
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sents other departments asserting authority in conflict 
with that of the Board of Education, or (4) where the 
Attorney General is actually an adverse party, the Board 
of Education must be permitted to employ independent 
legal counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants respectfully submit that the declaratory 
judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. To 
affirm the District Court his court must conclude as a 
matter of law the following: 
1. The State Board of Education was created by 
1:J· the constitution. It is a constitutional body. Its executive 
~.: officer was named in the executive department of Gov-
ernment. 
~I 
2. Article 10 of the Constitution of Utah vests in 
the State Board of Education the general control and 
supervision of the public school system. Such powers, 
rights, duties or functions as are within the terms, con-
trol and supervision used in Section 6 of Article 10 are 
not subject to c;ontrol or the approval of either the Board 
of Examiners or the State Commission of Finance. 
3. The State Board of Education in order to have 
control and supervision of the public school system 
must have the power and right to manage, handle, ex-
pend, employ and supervise all funds and personnel with-
in its jurisdiction. 
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It must have the exclusive right to determine the use, 
need, wisdom of and discretion in the expenditure of 
appropriated funds for the management, direct~on, ad-
ministraJtion, operation and regulation of the public 
school system. In this respect it must have the right to 
select personnel and fix their salaries. 
4. Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution of 
Utah specifically excludes from the jurisdiction of the 
Board of Examiners 
(a) Compensation of all officers which has 
been fixed by law and 
(b) Balaries of persons working for the state, 
its institutions and departments. 
5. As to claims originating with or incurred by the 
Board of Education or their proper agents, the Board 
of Examiners has the authority to examine said claims 
only as to their legality, more particularly in the follow-
ing respects : I'S the claim correct in amount; was it in-
curred for a lawful purpose; and is money in the treasury 
from which that claim can be lawfully paid~ With refer-
ence to said claims the function of the Board of Examin-
ers is essentially ministerial. The Board of Examiners 
cannot exercise discretion or review the wisdom of the 
expenditures except as to the personal expenses of the 
Superintendent of Public Instruction and the members 
of the Board. 
6. The authority of the Board of Examiners as con-
tained in Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution of 
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Utah is only granted until otherwise provided by law 
and may therefore be modified by the Legislature. 
7. The Governor and the Commission of Finance 
do not have authority to reduce appropriations made by 
the Legislature for public school purposes. 
8. The Finance Commission in exercising budgetary 
control in conjunction with the Governor or in pre-
auditing the expenditures of the State Board of Educa-
tion has ministerial authodty only to determine that said 
expenditures are within appropriated funds and are for 
public school purposes. 
9. The Board of Examiners and the Finance Com-
mission do not have authority over the employment of 
experts or specially qualified personnel by the Board 
of Education. 
10. The Board of Education m,ay employ independ-
ent legal counsel when the Attorney General is repre-
senting other state .agencies asserting rights in conflict 
with the authority of the State Board of Education. 
This includes the situation where the Attorney Gen-
eral is actually an adverse party or I efuses to repre-sent 
the Board of Education or recommends that the Board 
of Education employ other counsel. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAN S. BUSHNELL and 
RICHARDS AND BIRD 
.Attorneys for Respondents. 
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